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The literature on nonviolent political action has found that nonviolence far outpaces violence 
when it comes to winning political conflicts. Yet which actions nonviolent movements may 
perform to achieve success has rarely been studied. I argue that strategies which aim to limit 
the state’s economic capacity are likely to be effective, and test whether such economic 
strategies are predictive of democratization. I build upon both recent and classic nonviolence- 
and democratization literature to craft a theoretical narrative of why I expect economic 
nonviolent strategies to be effective. I then construct a measurement model for economic 
strategies using a novel combination of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 
3.0 dataset and Bayesian item response theory methods. Using the resulting latent variable of 
economic strategies as an independent variable, I test whether it is predictive of transitions to 
democracy using Bayesian logistic regression. I find that nonviolent political campaigns that 
use economic strategies are significantly more likely to cause a transition to democracy than 
those which do not – A one standard deviation-change in economic strategy corresponds to a 
doubling in the odds of democratization. My findings are relevant to the nonviolence- and 
democratization literature as well as for practitioners of nonviolent action and fill an important 
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Hit ‘em where it hurts:  
Measuring and testing the impact of economic nonviolent 
strategies on democratization  
 
“But a new leadership can and must be created by the masses and from the masses. The masses are the crucial 
factor. They are the rock on which the ultimate victory of the revolution will be built.”  
(Rosa Luxemburg 1919) 
“We live in capitalism, its power seems inescapable – but then, so did the divine right of kings. Any human 
power can be resisted and changed by human beings.” 
(Ursula K. Le Guin 2014) 
1.  Introduction 
Popular movements are viewed as one of the most important driving forces of democratization 
and political change. No political development or alteration is initiated, formulated, or 
implemented without humans’ agency. This is very clear in routine politics, where the process 
is bureaucratic, hierarchic, and modeled to fit some efficient ideal. In contentious politics, 
however, the impact of peoples’ actions on political developments are harder to observe and to 
measure. Yet the most important political changes spring from contention: democracy, 
capitalism, communism, empires, states, and nations all rise, fall, and change with contention. 
And contention is comprised of the strategic interaction of people who use their available 
resources, skills, and ideas to outsmart and defeat their opponents (Jasper 2006).  
 Recent research has found that the most effective grand strategy in contentious politics 
is nonviolence (e.g. Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; 
Kudelia 2018; Nepstad 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 
8-9) find that roughly 50 percent of nonviolent movements succeeded in the nineties and about 
70 percent in the early 2000s. The success rates for violent campaigns were roughly 25 and 15 
percent for violent campaigns in the same periods. The reasons for the efficiency of nonviolence 
are that nonviolence makes the movement appeal to a broad audience, it provokes defection in 
the security forces, and it makes it more difficult to repress the movements without causing a 
backlash-effect (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; 
Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer 2018; Kudelia 2018; Nepstad 2011, 2015; Sharp 1973a, 
2012; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). The security forces as a possible tool of repression are 
central to the state’s endurance. Because control over the police and the military, the monopoly 
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of legitimate violence, is one of the core definitional features of the state and its most severe 
sanctioning mechanism, it is an attractive target for popular campaigns. Without it, the state’s 
available responses to dissent are circumscribed. The previous literature centers heavily around 
the Weberian state as the organization with a monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1958).  
 These findings seem to apply to the entire spectrum of nonviolent action and do not 
discriminate between vigils, strikes, blockades, speeches, or marches. They say nothing about 
which strategies of nonviolence achieve security force defections or backlash, or whether 
different actions produce different results. It is improbable that all types of nonviolent action 
are equally effective. Therefore, I investigate whether nonviolent movements that use economic 
strategies of contention are more likely to achieve democracy. Because targeting and limiting 
the violence-capacity of a state is an efficient way to win a political struggle, I believe the same 
should be true for its financial capacity. Threatening violence is more severe than most financial 
threats and may inspire repression from the state. But the economic capacity of states lays the 
foundation for every state activity, including violence. Money is a central incentive for 
recruitment to the security forces, and therefore necessary for its existence. Limiting the 
financial capacity of states can be an effective way of producing regime transitions. I argue that 
nonviolent movements can utilize economic strategies to limit the capacity of the state to 
repress them, analogous to directly targeting the monopoly of violence.   
 However, different strategies may produce unequal results in different contexts. 
Campaigns vary in size, framing, organizational structure, and class composition. The 
particularities of the target state are also bound to alter the campaign strategies’ efficiency. 
Whether states are financed by taxation or loans, natural resource rents or foreign aid may 
require campaigns to adopt novel strategies. Not all revenue sources are equally susceptible to 
economic coercion by citizens. It is necessary, therefore, to account for macroeconomic 
differences between states when assessing how they might be challenged.  
1.1. The Kapp Putsch and the general strike 
On the 13th of March 1920, nationalist militants led by Wolfgang Kapp and Walther von 
Lüttwitz attempted to seize power to advance monarchist, conservative, and nationalist policies 
(see for example Feldman 1971; Sharp 1973b). While the political tumults of the Weimar 
Republic, unfair restrictions on German military capacity imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, 
and elephantine reparations owed by Germany provided a political space for opposition, it was 
the order to disband important Freikorps which ultimately prompted the putschists to act. This 
of course was a military takeover, and its tools were threats of violence. However, the elected 
3 
 
center-left Müller government, which was forced to flee from Berlin to Stuttgart as the 
putschists marched into the capital, called for a general strike on March 14th. Workers were 
quick to join in, and the strike spread throughout the country.1 The new, self-declared 
Chancellor Kapp and his provisional government met much resistance in the bureaucracy, 
which refused to enforce policies – banks refused loan-orders with Kapp’s signature and 
ministers refused to resign or otherwise to implement changes. Even the staunchly anti-
communist business class, holding great power in Weimar Germany and many of whom 
supported the organizations from which the Kapp Putsch arose, were critical of the coup 
(Feldman 1971, 101-103; Raloff 1971). The country was very quickly brought to a standstill by 
the general strike, and the putschists were unable to claim or exercise power because the 
bureaucracy did not cooperate (Raloff 1971; Sharp 1973b, 277). On March 17th, the putschists 
surrendered and were exiled, and the Müller government returned to Berlin (Feldman 1971). 
 The general strike illustrates several moments that are central to my research question. 
First, it demonstrates the possibility that would-be dictators can be stopped in executing their 
policies through mainly economic strategies. The general strike froze the German economy and 
bureaucracy, which in turn ensured that the putschists had no capacity to implement policy. 
Second, it demonstrates the role which consent plays in governance. Without the consent of the 
people, rulers will have a hard time implementing policy. The illegitimate and unpopular 
putschists had not established sufficient relations of loyalty with the German people, and unlike 
some successful coup-makers did not have the resources they needed to ensure compliance 
without consent.   
 However, this is an easy case where the target is illegitimate, unconsolidated, and 
unpopular. The putschists were opposed from day one, whereas other dictators have years to 
solidify their position and become a taken-for-granted part of life by their subjects. The 
exceedingly unpopular putschists were nothing of the sort, as even industrial capitalists 
lamented Kapp and his allies, as illustrated by one chemical industrialist:  
One holds one’s head and asks whether men with brains and understanding or fools and lunatics 
have taken over the new leadership. As a businessman, therefore, I condemn what has happened 
thoroughly and completely, and I hope that the military hotheads in Berlin will soon come to their 
senses (Carl Duisberg, quoted in Feldman 1971, 102).  
                                                 
1 No doubt the speed and enthusiasm was amplified by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft guaranteeing impunity for the 
striking workers, resolving that “[…] strike days up to and including Wednesday, March 17, were not to be counted 
against leave time, guaranteeing that workers would not be disciplined for participation in the general strike” 




The situation in 1920’s Germany is not common. Rarely are both bourgeoisie and proletariat so 
uniformly opposed to a regime or leader, and rarely are general strikes tolerated by capitalists.2 
Many coups-makers are more long-lived, however, such as the 1976 Argentine military coup 
installed a regime lasting for seven years. The 2013 military coup in Egypt saw general Fattah 
el-Sisi oust president Morsi, and el-Sisi was himself elected in 2014, still incumbent at the time 
of writing. With the recent change in the presidential term length, el-Sisi can potentially remain 
in office until 2030 (Michaelson and Youssef 2019). The speed with which the Kapp Putsch 
was thwarted is not a testament to an intrinsic weakness of coup-installed government, but to 
the importance of withdrawing consent and of popular, nonviolent action in contentious politics.  
 My argument that political conflict can be won by limiting the capacity of the state is 
supported by this. The failure of the putsch was a product of the general strike, which resulted 
in a paralyzed state with no capacity for policy implementation. The importance of the 
Weberian violence-monopoly was not very central here, as the only real source of power the 
putschists had was military power. But the general strike against the Kapp Putsch did more than 
limit growth or slow down production or infrastructure – it completely froze the political 
apparatus. Cases of nonviolent campaigns limiting the state’s economic capacity alone should 
also exist, without bureaucratic support.   
 For similarly to the Weberian state-definition, Joseph Schumpeter argues that the 
modern state is characterized by its authority- and need to tax (1991[1919]). Historically, the 
“tax-state” evolved from rising war expenditures and insufficient credit supply, which led the 
medieval prince to seek revenue from taxation. Tilly (1985, 172) synthesizes the definitions of 
Weber and Schumpeter:  
[…] the quest [for more effective war-making] inevitably involved them in establishing regular 
access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit and in imposing one form of regular 
taxation or another on the people and activities within their spheres of control. 
Both historically and conceptually then, the essential traits or institutions of the modern state is 
its ability to legitimately use violence on and extract taxes from its subjects. I juxtapose the two 
pillars of power: seeing that targeting and limiting the violence-capacity of a state is an efficient 
way to win a political struggle, I argue that the same should be true for its financial capacity. 
The threat of violence is more severe than most financial threats, but the financial capacity of a 
state underpins every state activity including violence. Money is a central motivation for anyone 
employed to enforce policy and states therefore need capital to form a security apparatus in the 
                                                 
2 Duisberg and other capitalists blamed the strikes on the putschists, and Duisberg was satisfied to call the strikes 
“[…]not necessary because nothing can be achieved by them” (Feldman 1971), which is illustrative of the relative 
calm with which capitalists saw the strike.  
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first place. Limiting the financial capacity of states can plausibly be a fruitful tactic for 
nonviolent movements.  
 This is supported by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), who argue that elites fear that 
democracy brings redistribution. Or, more elaborately, that elites who profit from dictatorship 
prefer to stay in power and therefore refrain from expanding the rights to political participation, 
redistributing their capital, and losing political influence to allowing popular campaigns to 
overthrow them. When popular campaigns can harm the economy and with it the income of the 
elite, the costs of staying in power rises. Democracy comes about as a compromise when the 
people threaten revolution and the rich want to remain powerful and wealthy. Similar points are 
made by among others Przeworski et al. (2000), O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Skocpol 
(1979). 
 The Kapp Putsch was a weak case, unconsolidated and opposed by everyone. Are there 
stories of more stable regimes that have changed because of economic strategies?  
1.2. East German emigration   
No-one expected the Berlin Wall or the Soviet Union or its satellites to collapse in the late 
1980s. They were considered very stable at the time, and the failure of political scientists to 
predict the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was not surprising (Nepstad 2011). Yet collapse they 
did. For the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), a contributing 
factor in the collapse was the mass emigration that occurred throughout its existence, in which 
mainly young, educated people fled the country to seek better fortunes in capitalist countries 
(Nepstad 2011, 44-45).3 The economy suffered as important labor was absent and many goods, 
services, and technological development became unavailable. Industrial growth slowed down 
significantly over the years, and hospitals, factories, and bureaucracies were understaffed. The 
emigration, lack of human capital and resources, and public protests caused the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989, and the GDR was reunited with the capitalist West in 1990.   
 Being motivated perhaps primarily by fear and improvement of personal situations, the 
effects of migration on the GDR economy are unintended but not necessarily unknown or 
unwanted by the emigrants. It does however serve to illustrate the importance of economic 
capacity for states to execute their policies and stay in power. Economic downturns provide an 
opening for the opposition to manifest in the first place, because as grievances grow so does the 
urgency of changing politics. Furthermore, economic downturns limit the capacity of states to 
                                                 
3 Some 5.275.000 people emigrated from the GDR from 1950 to 1993 according to a Council of Europe report 
(Kaya 2002).   
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counter the opposition – without supplying goods and services, taxation and other forms of 
domination become illegitimate and violence is left as the only tool for repression. The impact 
of economic strategies on states may therefore be two-pronged: it may increase the motivation 
to protest in the first place and limit the capacity of the state to resist popular demands.  
 As an additional factor in the collapse, the Gorbachev administration in the Soviet Union 
announced a weakening of ties between Moscow and its satellites (Nepstad 2011, 43-44). Both 
economic and military support was reduced, and the GDR could not count on Soviet support 
for repressing protest. This policy change was perhaps crucial to the socialist government’s fall, 
as foreign economic support may have alleviated many of the concerns which harried it. This 
was the case in case in the GDR in 1953, and in Hungary in 1956 (Nepstad 2011, 43). A closer-
knit Eastern bloc may have been able to eschew protests and prolong its existence.    
 While emigration from East Germany may not be immediately thought of as nonviolent 
action, I believe it is just that. A person physically removing themselves from a polity to oppose 
it costs the regime the person’s entire contribution to the economic, political, and sometimes 
even the social life of the country. Hirschman (1970) discusses the choice of whether to exit a 
polity or voice one’s discontent with a measure of spinelessness,4 implying that the exiting a 
polity is indeed a type of political nonviolent action.  
 Different types of nonviolent action which target the state’s economy and financial 
sanctioning power can be used to challenge the state and its policies. The efficiency of such 
action should depend on the size of the protest, the framing of protests, the movement’s 
organization, and many other idiosyncrasies. It should also vary with the qualities of the state. 
States get funding for their activities from many sources: taxation, loans, state-owned 
businesses, or just straight-up printing money. Not all revenue sources are susceptible to 
economic coercion by citizens. Which state characteristics affect the use of economic 
nonviolence?  
1.3. Resilient Panamanian narco-militarism  
In the late 1980s, Panamanian military dictator Noriega was struggling with civilian protest, 
foreign withdrawal of support, a declining economy, high unemployment, and growing 
                                                 
4 Hirschman (1970, 103-104) discusses exiting public goods-producing organizations such as states and argues 
that a measure of “spinelessness” can help explain why some stay or leave. As a public good turns into an evil, 
those with backbone leave and improve their lot elsewhere, while the spineless stay and suffer. If the stayers later 
grow spines however, because of a worsening of the situation for example, they may voice their dissatisfaction 
and change the evil-producing organization to the better. This last point is analogous to Sharp (1973a, 2012) and 




resentment from within his own forces (Nepstad 2011). Noriega’s attempts to repress the 
opposition by violence, electoral fraud, and purging the military forces of disloyal members 
resulted in increased adversity in the population, worsening international relations, and 
withdrawal of investment and assets by international financial actors. Demonstrations were at 
one point some 750 000 strong,5 and their leaders were inspired by the recent ouster of 
Philippine dictator Marcos. Despite these seemingly advantageous circumstances and 
significant turnout, Noriega only lost power when the US invaded and virtually crushed the 
Panamanian military resistance.   
 Nepstad (2011) argues that the resilience of the dictatorship is attributable to financial 
support from international allies such as Cuba, Taiwan, and Libya, and to noncooperation with 
the US from Japan, among others. Additionally, Noriega was allegedly part of the drug trade 
and an accomplice of the Medellín drug cartel, which provided both financial support and a 
threat of retribution should he resign and potentially rat them out to the US. The external 
assistance and support is exactly what was lacking in the case of the GDR.   
 Nygård (2015) argues a similar point: Interventionist international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) can solve commitment problems for the nondemocratic regime by 
guaranteeing that the opposition commits to certain policies. He finds that membership in 
interventionist IGOs decreases the likelihood of regime transitions (Nygård 2015, 423). IGOs 
can also sanction autocrats which repress the opposition. Dictators know this and can block 
such sanctions and deals through non-compliance and alleviate their impact by cooperating with 
sympathetic foreign leaders.   
 The Panamanian case illustrates that states have an advantage over the opposition by 
possessing unique tools capable of remedying the damage caused by nonviolent strategies. 
While Noriega’s involvement in drug trafficking is a tactic rarely used by the state apparatus, 
material support from allied states is indeed used. With the right allies and counterstrategies, 
dictators can stay in power despite extreme opposition.  
 These three cases illustrate that states sometimes transition to democracy when faced 
with economic hardship, caused by structural factors or social movements. States are also 
capable of resisting such economic pressure even when it is great and have access to capital 
which is unavailable to non-state actors. States are thus not only vulnerable to defections in the 
security forces but also to the economic power of the people when used against them.  
                                                 
5 The population of Panama per 1988 was roughly 2 300 000 (United Nations 2017). 750 000 is about 33 per cent 
of the population.  
8 
 
1.4. Investigating economic nonviolent action 
The question I pose is this: Do campaigns using economic, nonviolent strategies affect the 
likelihood of a transition to democracy? I thus attempt to fill a knowledge gap in the literature, 
as no quantitative analysis of which I am aware has tested this particular relationship. Attacks 
on state capacity by social movements and nonviolent political campaigns are rarely studied, 
and drops in state capacity are often seen as openings for potential mobilization rather than a 
consequence of political action (i.e. Skocpol 1979). This is relevant to the nonviolence literature 
which has produced convincing answers to how successful nonviolent strategies are vis-à-vis 
violent ones, but which has afforded little attention to the actions of nonviolent activists.  
 To fill this knowledge gap and provide convincing, novel results, I take advantage of 
the recent nonviolent literature in combination with much of the classic democratization 
literature to craft a theoretical narrative explaining why I expect economic nonviolent strategies 
to produce transitions to democracy. I construct a measurement model to identify the use of 
economic strategies in a set of political conflicts, which to my knowledge has not been done 
before. The freshly available Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes 3.0-dataset 
(NAVCO 3.0; Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018) provides a great starting point for this 
novel take and lets me answer my research question in a relevant way with new data.   
 I first review some key literature on nonviolence and democratization in chapter 2. The 
main point I make is that it should be possible to use nonviolent action to affect state economic 
capacity, with reference to for example Dahl (1971) and his cost of tolerance- and cost of 
repression concepts. The nonviolence literature has found a strong connection between 
nonviolence and security force defections, which exemplifies the causal utility of the Weberian 
definition of a state and what is important to its power.    
  In chapter 3 I supply a theoretical argument for why I expect economic nonviolent 
action to have an impact on the likelihood of transitions to democracy and under what 
conditions. I have already sketched the main points of the theory: Because revenue is important 
to a state’s capacity, I expect economic strategies to be effective; and because states have 
relatively great economic power vis-à-vis popular campaigns, I expect the effect of economic 
strategies to vary by the state’s sources of revenue. For example, it is unlikely that dictatorships 
rich on natural resources should be accommodating toward popular demands for regime change 
because the cost of losing power is very large. Those largely financed by taxation may be more 
amenable, as the population and their economic activities are important to their income. 
Additionally, states financed by foreign aid may be more or less susceptible to popular 
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demands, depending on the benefactor. Democratic financers will threaten to withdraw if 
mobilization is answered by repression, while autocratic ones will defend their ally’s rule. The 
above case-examples demonstrate the plausibility of these expectations and the mechanisms by 
which nonviolent campaigns interact with regimes.  
 In chapter 4, I argue in favor of using an item response theory (IRT) measurement model 
to estimate nonviolent campaign strategies’ “economicness,” or the degree to which they 
employ economically directed strategies. The best available data on strategies and tactics is the 
NAVCO 3.0 data (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018), which records about 200 specific 
types of action in nominal variables. I separate the relevant indicators into dummy variables 
and use an IRT measurement model to construct a metric scale of economic strategy. This 
allows for metric scales and for agnostic weightings of the measurement’s indicators, both of 
which are desirable traits for subsequent hypothesis testing (Schrodt 2014). Furthermore, it is 
important to be mindful of the coherence between the concept which is measured and the 
quantification of that concept. This improves the validity, reliability, and credibility of the 
quantitative analysis and inference. I argue that measurement models should be used more often 
in political science and devote ample time to the necessary concept-measurement discussion 
which such efforts must entail.    
 In chapter 5, I explain the methods I use to construct the measurement model and to test 
my hypothesis that economic strategies increase the likelihood of democratization. I use a 
Bayesian IRT model to score the different nonviolent campaigns, and subsequently use this 
score as a predictor of democratization in a Bayesian logistic regression. IRT is similar to factor 
analysis but is applicable to data consisting of binary indicators rather than metric ones. The 
main advantage of Bayesian methods is that there is no assumption of repeated sampling. I 
argue that it is therefore appropriate for the data I use, and also that they help communicate the 
uncertainty inherent in the data.  
 In chapter 6, I describe the data with which I form the measurement model and the 
process of preparing the data for analysis. I use the data from the NAVCO 3.0 dataset 
(Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018) for strategy-data. For data on democratization, I use 
the Democracy and Dictatorship index (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Both these 
sources I argue are state-of-the-art and conform well to my concepts and have the causal utility 
I need to answer my research question.   
 In chapter 7.1, I present the results from the Bayesian IRT model based on the indicators 
in the NAVCO 3.0 dataset. In chapter 7.2 I test the hypothesis that economic strategies are 
predictive of democratization. I report the results of my two analyses and discuss the application 
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of IRT for my particular purpose of measuring economic strategies, and the variation in the 
likelihood for democratization explained by economic strategies. I also discuss alternative 
specifications of my models to highlight strengths and weaknesses in my analysis and to suggest 
other, potentially fruitful approaches.  
 Lastly, in chapter 8, I discuss the implications of my findings for the literature on 
nonviolence, and for popular campaigns wanting to challenge their dictator with nonviolence. 
I conclude that my measurement model is fruitful and well-specified both theoretically and 
empirically, although different methods for constructing measurement models are also 
applicable. The approach of using measurement models to summarize data on strategy seems 
good, and I recommend that my approach is explored and developed further by others. I also 
find that economic strategies are robustly linked to the likelihood of democratization. Increasing 
the level of economicness in a movement’s strategy by one standard deviation increases the 
odds of democratization in that country by roughly two, i.e. the likelihood doubles. This is a 
large effect, and it does not change its sign by removing any of the control variables, although 
it does vary somewhat in size. I argue that this is an important finding which is relevant for 
activists in addition to filling a knowledge gap in the nonviolence literature.  
2.  Literature review 
To explain why I expect economic nonviolent strategies to impact democratization, it is first 
necessary to review some of the literature concerning both democratization and nonviolence.  
2.1. Nonviolent strategies 
Apart from the violent-nonviolent binary, little research has been done on the strategies of 
democratization campaigns. This lacuna in the literature is problematic, as it limits the ability 
of campaigns to draw on systematic and rigorous evidence to back up their efforts. The efforts 
of Sharp (2012) testify to the powerful impact such works can have, his book From Dictatorship 
to Democracy having been translated to over 30 languages and being a source of inspiration to 
activists in many countries.  
 Research on the violence-nonviolence dichotomy has produced diverging answers to 
the question of how campaigns ought to direct their resources toward success in bringing about 
democracy. Some find that violence sometimes works and that selective use of violence at the 
right time can be productive. The Ukrainian umbrella organization Right Sector during the 2014 
Maidan protests exemplify this. They reinvigorated a mass protest which was losing momentum 
by using violence against police, ultimately succeeding in forcing the president to resign 
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(Kudelia 2018).  
 Others find positive effects of nonviolence. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that 
nonviolent strategies are significantly more effective than violent ones, and attribute this to 
nonviolent campaigns’ legitimacy, and the backlash effect that sometimes results from 
government repression of them. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) argue that strong, broad, 
nonviolent coalitions produce great democratic gains, contrary to smaller, narrower coalitions. 
Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer (2018), Nepstad (2011), and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) 
speak to the importance of the military, and that producing loyalty shifts on some decision-
making level of the armed forces is essential to successful regime challenges. This is the main 
finding in the strategic nonviolence-literature and explains much of the difference in success 
rates between violent and nonviolent, and successful and unsuccessful nonviolent campaigns. 
 Testing correlations between regime type and strategy efficiency, Cunningham et al. 
(2017) find that given maximalist claims on governments, nonviolent campaigns are more 
likely to emerge in autocracies than in anocracies (i.e. semi-democratic regimes), and more 
likely in anocracies than democracies. The authors theorize that this is because grievances are 
high in non-democracies, which incentivizes maximalist claims-making. The incidence of 
nonviolent mobilization, furthermore, is positively influenced by the number of NGO chapters 
in the country, and nonviolent campaigns in neighboring countries (Cunningham et al. 2017, 
478). Nonviolent campaigns seem to spring from fertile soil, where opportunities and resources 
are available to activists.   
 These findings all center around imposing costs on the opponent, and on using available 
channels and resources to gain leverage. Or, in other words, they concern minimizing the costs 
of organizing. Violence imposes direct, coercive costs on the opponent, and signals 
perseverance and commitment (Kudelia 2018, 503) – sometimes to an extreme extent, as with 
suicide bombings – raising the expected future costs as well (Pape 2005). Nonviolent campaigns 
employ strikes, blockades, marches and a large array of similar tactics (Sharp 1973b, 2012), 
some of which directly impose costs by coercion (Aitchison 2018; Klein and Regan 2018). 
Others focus on persuasion, such as making statements and communicating with potentially 
sympathetic segments of society, or deterrence, for example by signaling increased costs should 
the opponent choose to act in a way the campaign does not want (Aitchison 2018; Jasper 2006; 
Sharp 1973a).  
 What strategies and tactics impose the highest costs on the regime? Klein and Regan 
(2018, 489) argue that size, geographical dispersion, and the nature of the demands made by 
protestors increase the cost of repression. Larger protests obviously have higher disruptive 
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potential than smaller ones. One of the main weaknesses (or strengths) of nonviolence contra 
violence is that nonviolence requires comparatively many participants to be effective, whereas 
violence does not (Sharp 1973b, 110). This does not mean that all nonviolent protests have 
many participants – there is considerable variation in protest sizes.6 Large, geographically 
dispersed protests combined can be very effective (Klein and Regan 2018), especially if they 
target important infrastructure and institutions. Concentration is not necessarily 
counterproductive, however, for instance in the cases of Egypt’s Tahrir Square protest7 and 
Ukraine’s Maidan revolution (Kudelia 2018) which were arguably geographically concentrated 
and both resulted in the ousting of governments. Demanding regime change is probably more 
effective in the capital than in the countryside. Large protests with many participants further 
lower the risk that any single person will be arrested face personal consequences, which again 
lowers the cost of participation (Olson 1967).   
 Additionally, different types of demands carry different costs to the regime (Klein and 
Regan 2018). Demanding alleviation of grievances or minor policy changes imposes small costs 
while calling for regime change and democracy is antithetical to the core interests of the regime. 
Maximalist demands are therefore inarguably costlier to nondemocratic regimes than more 
limited demands like taxes and social rights (Klein and Regan 2018). This is the core idea of 
Dahl’s (1971) cost of toleration-concept, wherein the likelihood of democratization is 
negatively correlated with the cost of accommodating popular demands. Conversely, the cost 
of repression is positively correlated with the likelihood of democratization – and increasing 
repression-costs is what nonviolent contentious action is all about. Klein and Regan (2018) find 
that different patterns of state response to mobilization depend on the degree of concession 
costs and disruption costs, which are analogous to Dahl’s (1971) costs of toleration and -
repression (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Przeworski 1991).   
 The finding of Cunningham et al. (2017) that nonviolent mobilization is more likely to 
emerge in non-democracies suggests that despite an increased risk of repression relative to 
democracies (Klein and Regan 2018), the potential reward of democratization outweighs the 
high costs of repression. This should, according to Olson (1967), scarcely happen. Individual 
costs are high when challenging repressive regimes, and the individual contribution to the 
achievement of the public good diminishes with the size of protests. Protestors have “[…] much 
                                                 
6 The NAVCO 3.0 estimate of participants (variable num_partic_event) for protests (variable verb_10 == 14) 
ranges from 1 to 5.000.000 participants with a mean of 28790 and median of 500 participants.  
7 Both 2011 and 2012 have a mean of 0.94 on NAVCO 3.0’s “nv_concentration” variable. Means for less protest-
dense years have insufficient variation for comparison, as many years have less than 10 protest-events.  
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more to lose than their chains” (Elster 1988, 223), yet maximalist nonviolence is more prevalent 
in regimes whose core interest is maintaining a stable ruler-subject relationship (Cunningham 
et al. 2017; Elster 1988, 223). This might however be an artifact of democracy itself because 
even maximalist claims are allowed to compete in the political routine, at least in many systems 
(Cunningham et al. 2017, 471). Additionally, several solutions to the participation paradox have 
been suggested, ranging from ideological commitment and moral imperative to social pressures 
and large grievances (Cunningham et al. 2017; Olson 1967; Ostrom 1990; Sharp 1973a; Sweezy 
1972; Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Yashar 2005). The issue of nonviolent campaigns’ emergence, 
while interesting, I leave to others.   
 These findings and theories center around the related concepts of removing the 
legitimacy of autocrats and subsequently imposing costs of repression so large that the regime 
cannot viably resist accommodating the opposition’s demands. The above historical examples 
demonstrate these mechanisms at work. In the Kapp Putsch-case, the costs of repressing the 
constitutionally elected government were sky-high, in that Germany and its bureaucracy ceased 
to function almost completely during the coup. This is perhaps the most extreme display of a 
regime’s illegitimacy of which I have heard. In East Germany, the toll of mass emigration 
contributed significantly to the decline of production and economic growth, and at the same 
time demonstrates the illegitimacy of the socialist government. This, along with the diffusion 
of protest from neighboring SSRs and satellites, helped bring about the seemingly super-stable 
GDR. In Panama, despite enormous protests and blatant illegitimacy, the Noriega government 
stayed in power by relying on material aid from other sources than its own population. And 
while drug trafficking is not a common business for states to get into, it serves to illustrate that 
alternative sources of funding can sustain even the most detested regimes for a while. Thus, the 
most severe threat which an opposition campaign can bring an autocrat is the removal of their 
main sources of power, namely their legitimacy, their security forces, and their revenue.  
2.2. Democratization 
Processes of democratizing nondemocratic regimes have historically happened through three 
idealized paths, according to Dahl (1971, 7). From being closed hegemonies with varying 
degrees of military, monarchic, religious, or imperial qualities, many states have increased the 
level of inclusion and competition in their political systems. With inclusion, these rights are 
extended to larger parts of the population than those already privileged, such as to the 
unpropertied, non-men, non-whites, and so on. Subsequent or concurrent processes of 
liberalization and inclusion constitute democratization and contribute to the legal and political 
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equality of citizens. With contestation come free and fair elections, the right to run for office, 
protection from electoral fraud, and the equal weighting of votes.   
 These processes have occurred either by expanding the franchise to larger parts of the 
citizenry before the competition, as in the Soviet systems, by first liberalizing competition as in 
the late nineteenth century Europe, or both simultaneously as in recently democratic states 
(Dahl 1971). Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam (2003) tie democratization to citizenship with their 
concept protected consultation, which conforms to Dahl’s definition but with additional 
emphasis on the rule of law. These rights are to be guaranteed to and protected for the citizenry, 
particularly minorities (Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2003, 13-14). Przeworski (1991, 54-55) 
describes liberalization as the toleration of autonomous groups, particularly political ones. 
 Hegemons rarely embark on these paths voluntarily, however. Democratization makes 
sense for a dictatorial regime when the cost of repressing the population’s demands rises above 
the cost of tolerating their participation in the political system (Dahl 1971; O'Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991). From the American Revolution to the Arab Spring, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union to the end of Apartheid, processes of democratization are 
contested. When by some mechanism the cost of denying rights of participation and 
contestation to the populace are increased, the rewards of dictatorial power are comparatively 
smaller (Dahl 1971, 15-16). If opposed, a dictatorial regime can choose to accommodate their 
demands, repress them, or ignore them (Klein and Regan 2018). The choice depends on both 
the severity of the costs imposed by the opposition’s activities as they try and achieve their 
demands and on the gravity of their demands, which Klein and Regan (2018, 490) call 
disruption costs and accommodation costs. The combination of these in a particular situation 
forces the regime and the opposition to compete for their preferred outcomes.   
 All contentious activity between regime and opposition do not end in regime transition, 
however. Great disruption costs coupled with non-threatening costs of accommodation, such as 
liberalization of access to abortion, may be accommodated by the regime. The cost of tolerance 
is small, while the cost of repression or dismissal can be great. Inversely, demands for leader 
resignation or regime change by fringe groups with little political clout or a broad support base 
are likely to be repressed (Klein and Regan 2018, 517-518).   
 Repression too may be inspired by the costliness of demands and disruption. Klein and 
Regan (2018, 508) find that increased disruption costs lead to increases in the likelihood for 
accommodating opposition demands on average and that increases in concession costs, for 
example from single-issue policies to maximalist demands of leader resignation, is likely met 
with repression.   
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 The same logic is applied by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). They argue that the key 
to lasting democratization is to guarantee material or political security to the regime actors, for 
instance in the form of pacts offering seats in the national assembly for junta members, or 
guarantees against large-scale redistributive policies (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 45-46, 52-
54). By leveraging disagreements or “splits” in the regime, the opposition can negotiate pacts 
with regime soft-liners and exclude hardline authoritarians from the process of democratization. 
Substantive guarantees and limits on the legitimate domain of politics can be undemocratic 
themselves, but lower concession costs and help increase the likelihood of democratic transition 
(Klein and Regan 2018; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The approach of O'Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986)  is an actor-centered one, which is an important perspective when dealing with 
regime-altering contention and often bloody conflicts that threaten lives on all sides, a threat 
perhaps strongly felt by dictators losing control of their population.   
 Similarly, Przeworski (1991) posits that democratization begins with splits in the regime 
or with popular mobilization. A regime split between hard- and soft-liners precedes 
democratization when soft-liners believe that a limited opening of the political system will have 
low or even negative concession costs, such as producing a broader power-base to legitimize 
their continued rule in exchange for some increased protected consultation. Upon liberalizing, 
both regime and population assess their opponent’s preferences and the probability of 
succeeding and strategize how best to affect the interaction to their favor.   
 While Przeworski (1991, 60-66) uses a game theory framework and argues that no soft-
liners will liberalize and no popular campaign will mobilize for transition unless their 
calculations about their opponent’s perceived costs of oppression and tolerance are mistaken, 
he remarks that the presence of transitions prove that such miscalculations are common (1991, 
60-61). Arguably then, assuming bounded rationality for both sides allows for opposition 
strategies to influence the course of a potential transition to democracy.   
 The goal of chapter 3 is to formulate hypotheses about the importance of campaign 
strategies as stylized in Figure 1. This I confine to hypotheses about the impact of movements’ 
use or non-use of economic strategies. The research question of the thesis asks whether using 
economic nonviolent strategies affect the likelihood of a transition to democracy. Several other 
hypotheses can and should be derived from Figure 1, but I do not investigate the impact of 
economic strategies on backlash risk or democratic consolidation, or how the state acts to 
counter economic strategies.   
 There are probably many antecedent factors that affect campaign- and regime strategies. 
Structural conditions, the class composition of campaign and regime, ideologies, religion and 
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so on. I provide a link between such antecedent factors to the actual political contestation which 
takes place between regime and campaign and thus fill an important knowledge gap in the 
democratization literature.  








3.  Theory 
While the previous literature has identified some theoretical and empirical points – most 
concerning the Weberian state and the costs- and effects of popular mobilization – I flesh out a 
theoretical narrative for why I expect economic nonviolent strategies to cause transitions to 
democracy.  
3.1. Nonviolently attacking sources of power  
A state’s ultimate source of power is its ability to impose sanctions by threat or use of violence 
(Nepstad 2011; Sharp 1973a). Attacking and effectively hampering this ability is an important 
predictor of success by nonviolent action and consequently a recurrent finding in the literature, 
usually by provoking defections from the security apparatus (e.g. Binnendjik and Marovic 
2006; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer 2018; Kudelia 2018; 
Nepstad 2011, 2015; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Yet while the monopoly of violence is the 
foremost source of state power, material resources may also be important strategic targets for 
activists. To be successful, a democratization campaign must disrupt the state’s core sources of 
power (Sharp 1973a, 2012). Provoking security force defections, recruiting huge numbers of 
protestors, or organizing general strikes are ways of damaging states’ repressive capabilities, 
legitimacy, and economic performance (Sharp 1973a, b, 2012).  
 Nepstad (2011) identifies the withholding of material resources as a possible strategy 
for civil resisters and finds an indeterminate relationship between the technique and success 
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using her comparative framework. East German democrats succeeded in utilizing material 
power (among other things) to oust the communist regime, while the Chilean overthrow of 
Pinochet and the Philippine “bloodless revolution” removing Marcos did not. Yet they ushered 
in democracy anyway. During unsuccessful campaigns in China, Panama, and Kenya, only the 
Chinese protestors failed to withhold material resources (Nepstad 2011, 127), yet all three 
campaigns failed to bring about democratization.  
 Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Nygård (2015) argue that international 
sanctions, while potentially damaging to the civilian population as well as the regime, can help 
anti-regime campaigns. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show that international sanctions are 
more likely to be imposed in the presence of large and nonviolent campaigns than small and 
violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 52). Conversely, sponsorship and material 
aid from foreign states are more likely to go to violent than nonviolent campaigns. Nygård 
(2015) however, finds that membership in interventionist international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) decreases the likelihood of violent transitions, but that those autocracies 
with such memberships scarcely liberalize at all because they expect the IGO’s involvement. 
Both sanctions and state support are potentially good and bad for democratization campaigns. 
The South African campaign to end apartheid is an example where international boycotts, 
divestment, and sanctions helped put pressure on the regime. A similar strategy has only 
partially affected the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the importance of foreign aid for the 
Noriega regime in Panama shows that sanctions can be effective if there are no ways of 
circumventing them.   
 Are nonviolent, economic strategies always positively related to democracy? Surely not. 
Nepstad (2011) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) present inconclusive results; older macro-
theorists such as Moore (1966) argue that the bourgeoisie are essential for democratization, 
while Bernhard (2016) finds that this relationship does not hold after 1989; Wood (2008) argues 
that economic sanctions often produce unintended consequences for the people; Nygård (2015) 
finds that IGO membership is good for the transition process, but makes them unlikely in the 
first place. At the conjuncture of economics and politics, few things are certain or simple, but 
everything is important.  
 Moore’s theory and Bernhard’s findings suggest that who the activists are matters for 
the outcome. Dahlum (2018) finds that the coalition size and social segment of origin of 
nonviolent campaigns are positively related to democratization. In the pre-breakdown phase, 
broad coalitions are able to utilize diverse methods and resources thereby increasing disruption 
costs (Dahlum 2018, 6). Campaigns of working- and middle-class origins are more likely to 
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produce large coalitions, which suggests a relationship between economic class and 
democratization. These groups, along with peasants and the lumpenproletariat, are generally 
neither wealthy nor in control of direct influence over the state or state policy, which makes 
nonroutine collective action a potentially efficient tool for practicing contentious politics. When 
these classes are also the most likely democratizers, investigating their use of economic 
nonviolence may be interesting.   
 However, what is done by the opposition is potentially as important as who they are. 
And while the bourgeoisie and the proletariat possess very different motivations and resources 
it is the aggregate strategies and consequences of strategies that may bring a dictator to resign.  
3.2. Targeting states’ material resources 
Different sources of material resources support the regime by different mechanisms. Sharp’s 
theory of exercising power by withdrawing consent is focused on the vertical relationship 
between ruler and ruled (1973a), but horizontal support exists for both states and campaigns. 
Foreign states support or oppose each other by refraining from or engaging in trade, treaties, 
sanctions, and war, among other things. Interstate relations are not usually about domestic 
issues, because national self-determination is perhaps the key rule of the state game. The 
exceptions are however a relevant concern here: When states take a stand on others’ domestic 
politics, what are the consequences? Limiting the inquiry to situations of nonviolent 
mobilization should reveal interesting relationships, such as whether foreign support for 
nonviolent movements makes repression of the movement more likely, and whether economic 
sanctions to support movements harm or help.  
 Nygård (2015) finds that regime transitions are less likely to occur when the state is a 
member of an interventionist international governmental organization (IGO, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the 
Organization of America States (OAS)). This is because IGOs can support or punish the new 
regime depending on whether the agreements of the transition are upheld. This is highly related 
to the protected consultation and rule of law-arguments of Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam (2003) 
and Przeworski et al. (2000), and solves the commitment problem and uncertainty of the 
Przeworski (1991) game-theory model. With external support for domestic policy, a regime can 
be stabilized somewhat.   
 Popular campaigns often utilize international network and recruit other states to support 
their cause, too. State-movement relations are perhaps most obvious in territorial disputes, as 
in the cases of Palestine, Western Sahara, Transnistria, Kurdistan, and other would-be states. 
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Here, a major strategy for statehood-activists is to be acknowledged by other states, often 
requiring bottom-up mobilization in foreign countries to pressure governments. Movements 
also utilize foreign states’ sanctioning- and political power, such as the Argentine campaign to 
oust the Proceso military dictatorship in the early 1980s (e.g. Brysk 1993), and the Boycott, 
Divest, Sanction-campaign (BDS), advocating against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. BDS 
also advocates for consumer and business boycotts of Israeli goods and lists country-specific 
products to avoid for activists. The campaign thus employs both vertical and horizontal 
transnational networks.  
 What accounts for the different legacies of economic nonviolent strategies? Surely, the 
autonomous economic capacity of a state is determined by the composition of its income. The 
relative importance of exports, aid, taxes, and resource wealth determines a state’s ability to act 
independently of international and domestic actors.  
 Export-dependent states should be sensitive to external economic pressure to some 
degree, conditional on its market share and general demand. A monopolistic actor in a certain 
market may be in a stronger bargaining position than an atomistic one because importers have 
nowhere else to turn for the supplied good, which can make international boycott a less feasible 
method of resistance. The demand for a good may vary with the types of goods supplied – raw 
materials with utility for many industries such as oil or steel may be harder to boycott than 
luxury goods such as caviar or furs.  
 Boycotting industries on a large scale would however be damaging to the population 
and not just the regime’s tax base (Afesorgbor and Mahadevan 2016). Layoffs, bankruptcies, 
shortages, and wage cuts are some potential results of downturns in companies’ fortunes, 
auxiliaries which may dissuade activists from advocating economic strategies (Allen and 
Lektzian 2012; Wood 2008). US trade-restrictions on Venezuela are good examples of 
strategies with large humanitarian costs, in which cutting off consumer-goods export and oil 
imports limits the availability of jobs and necessities to discredit and destabilize the regime (e.g. 
Meredith 2018; Rodríguez 2018). In capitalist economies with limited state control of 
ownership, the effects of sanctions on trade may be unpredictable and difficult to alleviate, and 
the effect on state capacity may only work indirectly through shrinking the tax base. Wood 
(2008) even finds a positive relationship between sanctions and state repression, suggesting that 
the instrument is a double-edged sword.  
 Aid- or loan-recipient states should be similarly sensitive to international economic 
action. Different types of aid and loans may relate differently to protests, however. Those types 
which are conditional on some policy development, such as liberalization of the economy or 
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efforts to curb corruption, may be withdrawn easily if rights are infringed upon or political 
skullduggery is discovered. This can plausibly happen alongside mobilization against the 
regime; uncovering corruption can provoke resistance, so too violation of rights. Conditionality 
may also prevent transgression in the first place, as is the intended purpose. Whether this 
happens is a different question, and the effectiveness of conditional aid and loans has produced 
a diverse literature (see Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009 for an overview). Additionally, Peksen 
and Woo (2018) find that economic sanctions, particularly human rights-related ones, or those 
imposed by the US, make participation in IMF loan programs less likely. This suggests a vicious 
cycle of stagnation for countries plagued by dictatorship, human rights issues, and insolvency, 
which would make external economic pressure an unstable tool for democrats to employ. 
 Directly targeting tax revenue is a rare method for activists to use, which is unsurprising. 
Refraining from paying taxes is always illegal and often easily trackable, especially in states 
with sophisticated bureaucracies and digitalized and automated tax-collecting procedures. It is 
however a powerfully symbolic method of resistance; refusing the government its revenue 
marks strong disapproval and harms state finances directly and carries direct financial 
incentives for activists (Sharp 1973b, 240-243). The method is perhaps most efficiently used 
by the wealthy, as they possess disproportionate amounts of money and can impose great costs 
on a government without organizing collectively. This does not mean that the working classes 
cannot utilize the method to their benefit.  
 General tax evasion and capital flight, which is mainly apolitical and motivated by 
maximizing profit, should perhaps be included because it may often be in response to changes 
in monetary- or fiscal policy. For example, the capital flight that occurred in Mitterrand’s 
France in the early 1980s was a response to the Keynesian policies pursued by the elected 
government and led to a turn away from redistributive policies to inflation-control and 
privatization (e.g. Pisani-Ferry 2011, 24). The East German example is similar. Despite the 
political potency of capital, this thesis is limited to collective action and the effects of it on the 
likelihood for democratization. I do not explicitly include it in my empirical analysis.  
3.3. Hypotheses – Economic strategies and sources of state wealth 
Several factors should contribute to how well economic strategies work. First, I expect the 
impact of economic nonviolent strategies to differ with the state’s relative dependence on tax 
revenue. If a protest is mainly domestic and the regime is tax dependent, then sizeable, 
economic mobilization should be able to hit state finances hard. Taxation is among the most 
visible and important evidence of states’ dependence on the population, and this connection 
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makes demands for participation, rights, and redistribution just. Persson and Rothstein (2015) 
illustrate this with some qualitative interviews from Uganda, in which the respondents have few 
links to the state and little confidence in their ability to influence policy as a result. The effect 
of economic strategies will likely be contingent on the specific target institutions, the type of 
methods employed, and the goals of the campaign. In general, I expect that countries in which 
economic strategies are employed have a higher chance of becoming democratic than those in 
which economic strategies are not used.  
 The capacity of a state to impose taxation demonstrates its strength, however, and may 
also be a measure of citizen trust in the state, or of the state’s ability to alleviate the concerns 
of citizens before they develop into contention. Hendrix (2010) argues that the tax-to-GDP rate 
is indicative but insufficient as a measure of state capacity – while it demonstrates the monetary 
capacity of a state, it does not differentiate between the bureaucratic apparatuses required to 
collect taxes. A rentier economy may have relatively high tax revenue but be unable to collect 
“difficult” income- or property taxes efficiently. Conversely, an economy that relies on difficult 
taxes will tend to have a greater capacity for monitoring and demanding payment from its 
citizens (Hendrix 2010, 278-279). It is perhaps more reasonable then to expect that economic 
strategies for democratization are likely to be effective in low-capacity states, where the regime 
is unable to monitor its population, but may still retain the ability to alleviate concerns with 
rent-wealth. I expect that states with a high tax-to-GDP ratio are less likely to be democratized 
by economic nonviolent strategies.   
 Second, I expect that states in which revenue from natural resources is comparatively 
high will not concede to maximalist demands. I rather expect that they will be more likely to 
repress maximalist demands and concede to minimalist ones. The findings of Wood (2008), 
that economic sanctions are related to state repression, are suggestive; arguing that when 
stability is threatened the state opts for repression, Wood’s argument may travel to revenue-
loss from taxes as well as sanctions. With resource-rich states, this effect may be strengthened 
because resource-income can pay for the increased cost of repression (monetary costs, that is – 
not the broader Dahlian term). However, it may also be that resource wealth is sensitive to 
strikes in the industry – miners, oil rig workers and other critical parts of the workforce may be 
accommodated in their demands, save for maximalist ones. In such cases, I would expect to 
observe repression of campaigns akin to that which Wood finds in the presence of sanctions. In 
short, when single, important sources of cash are disturbed, the state represses those who 
threaten its income. Whether that resource is trade or oil does not matter when it is being taken 
away abruptly.  
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 Third, and already touched upon, I expect sanctions or discontinuations of foreign aid 
and loans to have a similarly diffuse relationship with the likelihood of a state to democratize. 
When trade and dependence on revenue from taxes on imports, exports, aid, and foreign capital 
are substantial, states have little bargaining power in an international conflict-situation. North 
Korea is an extreme example: the hostile international environment and its sanctions have 
contributed to a nuclear-militarist state ideology, which is leveraged by North Korea to increase 
international cooperation and improve the domestic situation. Another path chosen by many 
countries is conformity with neoliberal hegemonic rules-of-the-game, comparable to 
Mitterrand’s turnaround, often implemented painfully fast but with positive effects on 
democracy scores and aggregate finances.   
 The theoretical uncertainty around whether economic strategies produce democracy 
necessitates a probabilistic and quantitative approach to illuminate relationships. The general 
research problem is clear, however: Are economic nonviolent strategies positively related to 
transitions to democracy? Based on the above theoretical discussion, I do expect this to be the 
case and to find a strong relationship contingent on the state’s sources of revenue. I expect that 
nonviolent movements can use economic strategies to effect regime change, at least 
probabilistically.  
 This is because the economy is a core source of power for the state, and by effectively 
challenging it, a popular movement can gain influence over the state. I also expect this 
relationship to vary with state finance. States with a large economy are likely to be stable. So 
too those that receive aid from foreign states, and those with access to natural resource rents. 
Taxation too may be an expression of state capacity and resilience, but perhaps also of 
responsiveness. I expect higher taxation incomes to the state to be negatively linked to 
democratic transition. These hypotheses are listed below as a summary of my expectations.  
• H1: Higher scores on economic nonviolent strategies are related to a higher likelihood 
of democratization in the same country-year. 
• H2: States with a high tax-to-GDP ratio are less likely to be democratized by 
economic nonviolent strategies. 
• H3: States with a high resource rent-to-GDP ratio are less likely to be democratized by 
economic nonviolent strategies. 
• H4: Aid-financed states are less likely to be democratized by economic nonviolent 
strategies. 




4. Measuring economic nonviolent action 
How should different nonviolent strategies be defined, conceptualized, and measured? What 
level of analysis is appropriate, which traits are important about different strategies, and which 
indicators can be used to measure them empirically? Several comparative-, case-, and statistical 
studies have addressed different aspects of nonviolent strategy and found interesting 
relationships between strategies, structural factors and outcomes (e.g. Ackerman 2007; 
Binnendjik and Marovic 2006; Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and 
Uldfelder 2017; Kudelia 2018; Nepstad 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In accordance 
with Goertz’ second law (2006, 2), some of these authors have largely foregone explicit 
conceptualization in favor of spending their resources on measures, data collection, and 
hypothesis building and -testing. These studies are fruitful endeavors, as systematically 
collecting and analyzing data make generalizable investigations of social phenomena possible, 
from which much can be learned. It has however left the question of what constitutes a 
“strategy” undiscussed, which makes classification and fine-grained, quantitative analyses of 
nonviolent campaigns difficult. An overview of the different efforts to conceptualize nonviolent 
action is therefore necessary before I suggest a different approach. 
 Sharp (1973a, 65-67) distinguishes six classes of action in conflict situations. They are 
nonviolent action, persuasion, material destruction, physical violence against people, material 
destruction in combination with physical violence against people, and peaceful institutional 
procedures backed by threats and use of violence (i.e. ordinary politics in a state). These classes 
form the positive pole of the higher-order conflict-action concept, the negative pole being 
inaction (Goertz 2006, 31-32; Sharp 1973a, 64-65). An example of the same classification of a 
positive-pole concept is Lijphart’s distinction between consensus-democracies and majoritarian 
democracies, both subtypes of democracy, both opposites of autocracy (Goertz 2006, 32; 
Lijphart 2012). This negative concept space is an important distinction, and it embeds Sharp’s 
idea of whence power originates into the concept structure; for Sharp, change in the relations 
between regime and subject comes from the withdrawal of consent. When consent is present, 
you have no conflict with the regime and do not participate in conflict-action. The 
acknowledgment that states are not monolithic and that “Any human power can be resisted and 
changed by human beings” (Le Guin 2014) is the first step from consent to oppression and 
inaction toward action and change (Nepstad 2015, 4-7; Sharp 1973a, b, 2012). Nested in Sharp’s 
concept of nonviolent action then, are mechanisms for its emergence, and the mechanisms by 
which change is produced in political systems.  
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 Simultaneously, Sharp does not provide a clear-cut definition or an actual concept 
structure to form the basis of a measurement.8 The closest thing to a definition of nonviolence 
Sharp gives is the following:  
[…] nonviolent action is a technique by which people who reject passivity and submission, and 
who see struggle as essential, can wage their conflict without violence. Nonviolent action is not 
an attempt to avoid or ignore conflict. It is one response to the problem of how to act effectively 
in politics, especially how to wield power effectively (Sharp 1973a, 64, italics in original). 
So, nonviolent action is 1) a technique for 2) nonviolently 3) wielding power effectively 4) 
when engaging in political struggle 5) for those who both do not consent to submission and 6) 
reject inactivity. Some clarification on these points is necessary.  
 First, and least problematic, is the characteristic of nonviolence as a technique. 
Nonviolence is simply a set of ways to engage in political conflict. It is an important 
characteristic because it separates nonviolent action from random but similar acts. A technique 
is consciously used and purposefully thought out to change something, while other forms of 
action may lack direction. For example, a reverse strike is different to working overtime because 
the former aims to change something other than the amount of wage-payment and work that is 
realized on a given work-day, namely changing power-relations in the workplace (Sharp 1973b, 
402-403). By deviating from the expected pattern of behavior, namely going home at four 
o’clock, the workers display insubordination and organization, which alters the perceived 
power-relations in a negotiation or conflict.  
 Second, the “nonviolently”-part of the definition is murkier. Often, nonviolence is 
conflated with pacifism, which can indeed be a motivation behind nonviolence, but the two are 
unidentical. Nepstad (2015, 4-6) expounds upon the distinction divides nonviolence into a 
pacifist and a pragmatic type, the former describing the Gandhian school of moral nonviolence, 
the latter Sharp’s instrumental nonviolence. The main distinction between them according to 
Sharp (1973a, 82-83) is the emphasis on moral superiority and persuasion in the Gandhian 
strain; while pragmatists aim to out-maneuver their opponents, pacifists aim to persuade them, 
a class of conflict-action which Sharp distinguishes from nonviolent action (1973a, 68). 
Furthermore, nonviolent action is not synonymous with pacifism, but may be motivated by 
practical, instrumental, ethical, religious or other grounds for preferring of nonviolence over 
other techniques (Gleditsch 1971; Nepstad 2015, 12-22; Sharp 1973a, 67-68, 70-71). These 
distinctions may have little influence on the performance of the actual methods of nonviolence 
but can supply different motivations for joining, supporting, or suppressing nonviolent 
                                                 
8 Martin (2001, 23) states that “[…] nonviolence is easier to explain through examples than definitions or theory,” 




 Third, nonviolent action is one of several ways to wield power effectively, or to cause 
change with the resources available.  Everyone knows what power means, but the term is 
vacuous in analytical terms (Jasper 2006, 9). What is usually meant by power is a combination 
of resources and strategies, that is, directing available skills and means to get someone to act 
the way you want. The Weberian definition of power as being able to do something despite 
opposition or make someone do something they would not otherwise do thus grasps at the close 
relationship between the terms power and strategy (Jasper 2006, 9). Effective wielding of power 
must mean a successful, strategic use of the available skills and resources.  
 Sharp (1973a, 37) captures this by dividing the sources of power into authority, human 
resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors (culture, ideology, predisposition to 
obedience, etc.), material resources, and sanctions. Outcomes of strategic social interactions 
depend on the amount of the different resources available to the actors and how they direct them 
to persuade, coerce, or deter the other toward some course of action (Jasper 2004, 2006; Sharp 
1973a, 37). This is what “wielding power effectively” means. Importantly, it distinguishes 
nonviolent action from routine politics, which do not require wielding power at all but simply 
confirming the legitimacy of those who do wield it. In the context of attempting regime change, 
exercising power means heightening the cost of repression and lowering the cost of tolerance 
(Dahl 1971, 16). Previous findings on the efficiency of nonviolence suggest that this is indeed 
the case, particularly by undermining states’ repressive capabilities by provoking loyalty shifts 
in the security forces (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 46-49; Nepstad 2011, 128-131; 2015; 
Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).  
 Fourth, nonviolence is a way of engaging in conflict. When a disagreement over rights, 
duties, distribution, or priorities cannot be solved through routine political procedures, then 
nonroutine techniques of engaging with an opponent become viable alternatives (Sharp 1973a, 
64). This too is an uncontroversial point, but research into how and when nonviolent campaigns 
emerge may pay attention to sequences of claims-making, claim salience, and escalation. There 
are arguments to be made about inefficient governance causing frustration and subsequent 
nonroutine mobilization, but it is not central to this thesis.  
 Fifth, rejecting submission is essential to Sharp’s theory of nonviolent power. By 
realizing that obedience is unnecessary, withdrawing consent, and actively challenging unjust 
rule can oppression be eliminated and a fairer regime be constructed (Sharp 1973a, 2012). This 
is relatively easy in a dictatorial context – oppression is enacted by the dictator and suffered by 
the population. The target is clear and identifiable, and maximalist goals are easily formulated 
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as a desire to depose the autocrat. Martin (2001, 37-39) points out that this is often a 
simplification of suppression, and that Sharp’s theory has a harder time of dealing with more 
complex dominance, such as that of workers and consumer-activists under oligopolistic 
capitalism, complicated, multi-layered bureaucracies, or more nebulous phenomena such as 
patriarchy and racism. It might not be clear who or which institutions are exerting dominance, 
especially in systems of exchange, and the technique of withdrawing consent is harder to 
leverage for change. Opposition to states and dictators is a most likely-case for observing 
successful nonviolent mobilization against a system of dominance (Cunningham et al. 2017). 
 Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, the rejection of inactivity and passivity is not equal 
to the withdrawal of consent. In fact, grudging cooperation is functionally equivalent to any 
other form of consent to oppression. How one feels or thinks about injustice is of zero 
consequence to a dictator unless it is acted upon.9 Changing one’s behavior by refusing 
expected tasks or performing unwanted ones is the primary weapon of any resistance campaign. 
Inaction is the conceptual negative of Sharp’s action-classes. What motivates the shift from 
passive to active withdrawal of consent is not a question for this thesis but has produced a large 
and diverse literature, particularly the attention paid to the collective action problem (Olson 
1967). What motivates the choice of nonviolent action is a different question but probably based 
on a pragmatic assessment; activists simply believe it will work. Structural factors may play 
into this assessment, such as the degree of political space (e.g. regime-type effects on the 
emergence of nonviolence, see Cunningham et al. 2017).  
 These six definitional criteria are all essential to the concept of nonviolent action, and 
the definition hints at a classical necessary-and-sufficient concept structure (Gerring 2012b; 
Goertz 2006). The concrete observation of a nonviolent campaign is then relatively 
unproblematic: a group of people actively utilizing nonroutine, nonviolent techniques of 
influencing an actor in power toward some course of action satisfies all the criteria. 
 There can however be no pretense that all campaigns utilizing nonviolent action plan, 
utilize, and succeed in identical ways. Nonviolence is varied; different goals, opponents, and 
contexts shape how successful a campaign is (Ackerman 2007; Ackerman and DuVall 2000; 
Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Martin 2001; Nepstad 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). 
Efficient power-wielding depends on the power-sources propping up an opponent. How this 
                                                 
9 The popular quote by Desmond Tutu is illustrative: “If you are neutral in a situation of injustice, you have chosen 
the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has his foot on the tail of the mouse, and you say you are neutral, the 
mouse will not appreciate your neutrality.” (Quoted in Brown (1984, 19)). 
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definition may best be operationalized and measured is therefore an important issue in this 
thesis, to which I turn next. 
4.1. Measurement theory 
Properly measuring social phenomena such as nonviolent strategies is what makes political 
science a science; it is “disciplined summary” of social phenomena (Hooghe et al. 2016, 3) or 
the act of “establishing a metric of equivalence so that diverse observations can be […] 
compared” (Gerring 2012a, 726). Measurement links observation to theory by systematically 
ordering and analyzing observations. Rigorous, falsifiable, and replicable empirical treatments 
of concepts and their interrelations permit advancement of the communal understanding of 
human interaction, which requires some form of measurement, usually in the form of 
numbering observations for statistical testing (Gerring 2012b, 156; Sartori 1970). Importantly, 
this does not mean that investigations of unnumbered phenomena, description, or idiosyncratic 
events are unscientific on their own (Gerring 2012a); but proper description makes theory, 
classification, and conceptualization possible, and measurement links description to analysis 
(Gerring 2012b, 156). 
 Necessarily for valid measurements, “concept formation stands prior to quantification” 
(Sartori 1970, 1038). To assign numbers to something, it is essential to have a clear idea of what 
is being described by the numbers, and what the numbers mean in relation to the concept at 
hand (Adcock and Collier 2001). Sartori (1970, 1034) warns against the “unconscious thinker” 
whom he argues substitutes complex techniques of analysis for conceptual logic and 
measurement. Ignoring the ontology of concepts, what a thing is, diminishes the chance of 
measuring it correctly and learning something meaningful about it. These are not empty 
admonitions. Improperly specified regressions, under-theorized proxies, confounding 
variables, garbage-can models, and bad aggregations potentially affect the results of causal 
analyses tremendously (Achen 2005; Jackman 2008; Schrodt 2014). Indeed, these issues can 
hurt the advancement of quantitative social science and make it difficult to see what is gained 
from doing it (Johnson 2006). Consequently, great care and thought must be put into creating 
valid and reliable measures of social phenomena.  
 Adcock and Collier (2001) have a more iterative view of the joint processes of concept 
formation and measurement than Sartori, although they discuss much of the same issues. They 
argue that while clear concept and properly specified definitions are important for 
measurement, so too measurement and indicators are important for refining concepts and 
definitions (Adcock and Collier 2001, 531). An evaluation of measurement validity cannot be 
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detached from the conceptual definition, nor can conceptual discussions be separate from 
empirical observations. Arguing for a shared framework between the quantitative and 
qualitative camps, they propose a continual circle of evaluating concepts, definitions, 
indicators, and measurements. Their process is roughly equivalent to the steps I take in defining, 
operationalizing and measuring economic nonviolent strategy.    
 I have explained Sharp’s definition of nonviolent action above. The definition is 
operationalizable and touches on the essential traits of the concept and guides the process of 
forming a measure of economic nonviolent action. Importantly, having a clear definition makes 
the relationship I want to investigate a bit plainer: by actively using the economic nonviolent 
technique to reject submission and passivity wield power over the state, political campaigns 
can force regime transitions. However, the task of measuring and testing this relationship 
quantitatively remains.   
 Obviously, some concepts lack true values because they are directly unobservable. A 
strategy is such a concept and numbers attached to it mean little without a comparative 
reference. Inferring meaningful numbers based on observable indicators is still possible and 
often the best option available. An illustrative example of such a latent concept is social class, 
which can be thought to characterize a person’s societal status. To measure it, some 
combination of indicators of wealth and income, work and leisure, cultural habits, education 
and so on must be decided upon and weighted, the result of which can be said to measure social 
class. Using a proxy variable such as income to equal the latent social class-concept may cause 
problems in subsequent analyses (Jackman 2008, 126-129), for instance, if investigating 
whether social class affects voting patterns. A plausible finding is that higher class causes one 
to vote conservatively. Using a composite measure of the above potential indicators of social 
class might however illuminate other relationships and suggest that medium-level income 
combined with high education makes one likely to vote center-left, while low-income, low-
education people vote for populist right or socialist parties. The results may furthermore be 
attenuated by using only a proxy variable in place of a composite measure because the 
measurement error present in the proxy weakens the estimated coefficient, causing misleading 
inferences (Jackman 2008, 126-129).  
 Multifaceted concepts make measurement complicated. Identifying what the different 
parts of a concept are and which of them are most important is almost always debatable, 
exemplified by the ceaseless debate over what “democracy” is (e.g. Bollen 1979; Cheibub, 
Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Ghandi 2015; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000; 
Treier and Jackman 2008). The pragmatist answer to these debates is that a diverse environment 
29 
 
of concepts and operationalizations facilitates multiple approaches and refinements of 
hypotheses and theory. Investigating relationships between phenomena using different 
conceptualizations of the variables can reinforce findings that are common across approaches 
and help identify which definitional traits are central to different approaches. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) for example, find that inclusive institutional characteristics are conducive to 
growth, while others find that democracy is (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 
2000; Teorell 2010). Maximalist democracy-definitions can be hard to disentangle from 
“inclusive institutions,” so using a minimalist definition in addition to test the same hypothesis 
could help identify which democracy-characteristics drive the relationship.  
 Working with novel concepts, identifying which indicators are or can be part of a 
concept is both a deductive and inductive task (Adcock and Collier 2001). Deductively, a 
definition identifying different core traits is the first step to arriving at a set of indicators 
(Gerring 2012b, 108; Goertz 2006, 3), an inference that requires a solid theoretical foundation. 
Inductively, looking at extant data thought to represent a concept to derive the indicators is 
potentially fruitful, paying particular attention to the dimensionality of the concept and the 
relationships between potential indicators (Gerring 2012b, 173-175). Concept formation rarely 
happens in a wholly deductive or inductive manner but is most often an iterative back-and-forth 
process between theory and observation (Adcock and Collier 2001; Goertz 2006, 140).  
 This inductive-deductive joint process is particularly useful in the context of economic 
nonviolent strategy. The data which exist on tactics, most notably from the NAVCO 3.0 dataset 
(Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018) which I use, are highly detailed and collect a list of 
about 200 different tactics. Selecting indicators that apply to the idea of economic strategies, 
i.e. those that aim at targeting the state financially, enlisting IGO assistance or otherwise 
exercising economic power over the state, is simple. The inclusion criteria for the dataset assure 
that the observations are examples of political action in one form or another, and by selecting 
those cases which target the state, most of Sharp’s definitional criteria are met. I explain the 
data in more detail in chapter 6.    
  Beyond the identification of appropriate indicators of a multifaceted concept, indicators 
must be joined together to form the concept. Such aggregation schemes depend on ontology 
and concept structure (Gerring 2012b, 167; Goertz 2006, 27). Necessary-and-sufficient type 
concepts, or classical concepts, are indicated using Boolean logic and aggregated with 
multiplication or logical AND-operators (Goertz 2006, 40). Each indicator is considered a 
necessary requirement for inclusion in a class, and all the indicators combined are considered 
sufficient for inclusion. This results in a binary aggregation – presence or absence – of as many 
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indicators as needed to satisfy the sufficiency criteria (Gerring 2012b, 167; Goertz 2006, 39-
40). The definition of democracy promulgated by Przeworski et al. (2000) is an example. Lack 
of variation and loss of information are important criticisms of many uses of this concept 
structure. A relic of the simple aggregation is the danger that dissimilar observations may be 
classified as identical and similar ones as different. Another aggregation scheme is 
characterized by indicator substitutability and additive aggregation, resulting in graded 
measures (Goertz 2006, 59-62). This is the family resemblance concept structure, in which 
indicators’ values are summed to a total score, and thresholds may be imposed to delineate 
membership of classes (Goertz 2006). The Polity measure of democracy is an example, in which 
weighted sums of ordinal variables above six on a scale from negative ten to positive ten are 
counted as full democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2007; Munck and Verkuilen 2002). This 
concept structure provides variation but may be difficult to interpret because different 
combinations of indicator-values give identical aggregate values. Here too there is a risk of 
grouping different things together and similar things apart.10  
 Aggregation of classical concepts is given by definition – either all criteria are satisfied 
or not. Family resemblance aggregation is more flexible, as it allows the combination of 
necessary and unnecessary indicators, as well as different weightings of indicators based on 
their importance to the concept (Gerring 2012b, 167; Goertz 2006). This weighting is often 
somewhat arbitrary, however, and there are strong arguments for letting the data decide the 
weightings inductively through data summarization techniques (Hair et al. 2014; Jackman 
2008; Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 24). Having few theoretical expectations for the relative 
importance of indicators of a concept often ends in the assumption that they should be weighted 
equally, which is a strong and sometimes unfounded assumption. Allowing the distribution of 
the data to determine how they relate to the concept empirically and using factor scores or 
difficulty parameters as weights is a transparent and reproducible alternative, simultaneously 
yielding more valid and reliable measures of some concepts.  
 I achieve an agnostic aggregation scheme by constructing a measurement model for 
economic strategies, which I explain in chapter 5. The main reason for aggregating the 
indicators with a measurement model is that it does not require me to make judgments about 
the importance of each variable. Figuring out which variables are most representative of 
economic strategy is left to the statistical computations, and not given arbitrary weights a priori.  
                                                 
10 For example, Suriname in 1986 and Tajikistan in 1992 receive the same Polity-score of -6 but differ very much 
on the indicators. Suriname gets a score of 0 on the variable xropen, registering the openness of executive 
recruitment, while Tajikistan gets 4, the maximum possible score for the indicator (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).  
31 
 
 An important aspect of the ontology of concepts is to consider what the essential parts 
of a concept are (Goertz 2006, 27-28). This is similar to what Gerring (2012b, 130-131) calls 
causal utility, namely the extent to which a conceptualization captures the traits relevant for 
solving a problem or demonstrating a relationship. The utility of a concept is not fixed but 
depends on the problem at hand. Descriptively, every quality of a thing is a part of the thing 
itself, but some traits have different uses; the color and texture of a metal might be important to 
the artist, while the engineer is concerned with its ability to lead electricity or its reaction to a 
chemical. Likewise, the political scientist analyzing democracy and wealth may be interested 
in different traits than the one analyzing democracy and terrorism.  
 Furthermore, causal utility in science depends on exogeneity (Gerring 2012b, 130). If a 
concept is thought to explain a phenomenon in some way – say, democracy affects the quality 
of governance – it makes little sense to have “democracy” and “governance” overlap by 
defining both with a “rule of law”- trait, for instance. Just as one moves all instances of x to one 
side of an algebraic equation to solve it for x, the explained and explanatory variables must be 
separate to make meaningful statements about the relationships between them. While 
encompassing definitions of a concept can be appropriate in some contexts, minimalist 
definitions utilizing only the core essentials are often better for crafting exogenous 
explanations. However, some mechanisms linking the explanatory with the explained concept 
should at least be grounded in the former to make theories of a causal relationship convincing 
(Johnson 2006). For instance, the minimalist democracy of Przeworski et al. (2000) contains 
only criteria about elections and turnover, and is exogenous to governance, rule of law, national 
income and so on, and can easily be used to test relations between them and democracy. Why 
this relationship exists, meanwhile, requires some formulation of mechanisms by which 
democracy affects the dependent variable.  
 When constructing measures, particularly those intended for use as independent 
variables in a regression, several considerations and trade-offs must be made. First, the 
measurement of a variable must be valid both theoretically and empirically. A valid 
measurement measures what the creator claims it measures, resonates with the commonly 
understood meaning of the measured concept, and is comprised of indicators that tap into the 
important aspects of it (Gerring 2012b, 161; Jackman 2008). It is similar to unbiasedness and 
linked to the data collection process, wherein what is believed to be observations of interest in 
describing and analyzing a phenomenon are documented. Here the simultaneous deductive-
inductive nature of measurement is evident, as some assumption or theory determines what data 
are collected, with consequences for hypothesis testing. Validity is largely a theoretical exercise 
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– achieving it requires an understanding of the concept and how it maps onto the empirical 
world, as well as an overview of previous attempts at measuring the concept. It can however be 
tested empirically by comparison with other operationalizations of the concept (Jackman 2008, 
121-123).  
 Second, the measure must be reliable or accountable to be convincing. Given 
multifaceted or latent concepts,  the procedure of choosing and aggregating indicators must be 
transparent and replicable (Gerring 2012b, 167; Jackman 2008). Reliability, assuming that the 
concept of interest has a true value, can be measured by the variance of the indicators of the 
concept (Jackman 2008, 123-126). Precision is a synonym to reliability, and it is largely an 
empirical issue; a concrete measurement of a phenomenon is reliable if an observation is 
measured identically over time or by different observers (Jackman 2008, 124). This can be 
estimated by the test-retest method or an inter-rater reliability test. Given unobservable 
phenomena, inter-item reliability is a measure of the internal consistency of a composite 
measure, where the quantity of interest is the correlation between indicators of a concept 
(Jackman 2008, 124).  
 Achieving causal utility for a variable summarizing the extent to which nonviolent 
campaigns use economic strategies is not very hard. There is unlikely to be a problem of 
endogeneity in two concepts as distinct as a regime transition and a mobilization strategy. It is 
worth mentioning that there could still be considerable bias in the sample, such that those cases 
which see democratization were more likely to do so despite the presence of economic 
strategies. This represents yet another trade-off,  that between parsimony and omitted variable 
bias (Gerring 2012b; Schrodt 2014). The validity and reliability of the indicators I have chosen 
are discussed in chapter 6.     
 To summarize: measurements are structured descriptions which, by assigning numbers 
to phenomena, permit analysis of hypotheses. The phenomenon in question may be observable 
or latent and may be one- or multidimensional. Both multidimensional and latent phenomena 
require aggregation, and aggregation depends on the structure of the concept. To be useful 
beyond description, the measured phenomenon must have causal utility, which is affected by 
the research question. For arguments building on measurements to be convincing, they must be 
valid and reliable representations of the systematized concept. How phenomena are represented 
by measured indicators have consequences for causal analysis; proxy-variables, measurement 
error, and endogeneity can introduce significant bias and error in causal analyses.  
33 
 
4.2. Nonviolent action as contentious politics 
Keeping the lessons about conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation in mind, it is also 
important to ask what an economic nonviolent strategy is a case of. Sartori (1970, 1036) argues 
that to meaningfully compare phenomena they must be examples of the same higher-level 
concept or class. This Aristotelianism is in part mimicry of the natural sciences pervading the 
social sciences, which inspires measurement of everything measurable, without foundation in 
theory (1970, 1036-1038). Before quantification, Sartori writes, we must know “what it is that 
we are measuring” (Sartori 1970, 1038). Consequently, an effort to define what a concept is 
and is not, how it is distributed, what traits are essential to it, and how the traits relate to another 
is important.  
 To compare nonviolent strategies the higher-level concept must be defined. My subject 
of analysis can be described as nonviolent collective action, because I am interested in groups, 
acting more-or-less coordinated to achieve some goal. Olson (1967) describes collective action 
as a group of individuals acting together to achieve some shared goal or interest. This definition 
is extensive and contains nation states, interest organization, black metal bands, and elementary 
school classes simultaneously. Collective action is a classical concept with necessary and 
sufficient-inclusion criteria, as removing any of the three traits no longer qualifies for inclusion 
in the concept. A group of people acting together is not a case of collective action unless they 
have some shared interest they want to achieve; capitalists in the marketplace, for instance, 
want to reduce the size of the group to only themselves, achieving monopoly and maximization 
of profit (Olson 1967, 37-38). Similarly, a group of people waiting in line at the supermarket 
would be better off if there was no group at all, and they were the sole customer. This Olson 
calls exclusive goods as opposed to public ones, and while they are strictly shared (every 
member of the group wants more profit or shorter wait times), they are not collective interests.11 
If capitalists merge businesses or form cadres, or customers collectively plan and divide 
themselves efficiently into equal lines, one may speak of collective action, but groups 
competing for scarce resources or interests can hardly be described as acting collectively but 
rather as acting simultaneously.  
                                                 
11 Schumpeter (1954, 550-551) argues a similar point when discussing the term class: “[…] when we speak of 
working-class movements, we are indeed referring to masses of individuals but of individuals that rally around a 
group standard and form, as it were, a psychological corporation […]. When we consider the group of all the 
people who derive their incomes from selling services (personal efforts), we find that we are combining social 
types that have very little in common and hardly ever feel and act in unison. […] in short, we are considering a 
category that we [researchers] have formed ourselves.” His intention is to illustrate that classification must be valid 




 In addition, collective action can be apolitical. Metal bands and school classes are not 
necessarily so,12 but the arbitrariness and breadth of the definition is a problem (Collier and 
Adcock 1999, 548-550; Sartori 1970, 1035). Only the collective action geared toward public 
goods, perhaps, should be considered. This way political concerts and reading groups can be 
included while groups without explicit political aims or activities are excluded.  
 Collective action does not capture the informal or noninstitutionalized nature of protest, 
however, and an apter higher-level category might be contentious politics (Tarrow 1994), itself 
a subcategory of collective action. Tarrow defines this as “what happens when collective actors 
join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the 
claims of those they claim to represent” (1994, 4). This largely conforms to Sharp’s conflict-
action (1973a). Compared to collective action, contentious politics includes outsiders to the 
political system challenging the insiders, moving down the conceptual ladder to a more 
intensive concept. What contentious politics is not, is apolitical action, institutionalized politics, 
professional persuasion, or elites’ strategic interaction (Tarrow 1994, 8).   
 The unit of observation for Tarrow is the social movement, which is defined by four 
characteristics: a common purpose, a goal which the movement is aiming to achieve; collective 
challenges, in which groups act against their opponent to achieve their common purpose, 
directly or indirectly; some social solidarity, a common identification with other participants 
or their shared interest; and sustained contention, some continuity in their activities and goals, 
separating social movements from one-off spontaneous collective acts (Tarrow 1994, 8-12). 
 Contentious politics, then, is the phenomenon in which social movements consisting of 
outsiders to a political system collectively act against insiders to challenge some aspect of 
politics (Tarrow 1994). Whether the substance of the challenge is grandiose or not is 
definitionally unimportant; contentious politics can be small-scale and local, concerning some 
town environmental policy, or large-scale and global, touching on imperialism, wars or 
capitalism. For my thesis, I add the two movement characteristics with which I am occupied, 
namely nonviolence, and that the movements must have goals concerning the national political 
system. The concept is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 Figure 2 illustrates a necessary-and-sufficient type concept, which I believe is accurate, 
causally fecund, and which resonates with Sharp, Tarrow and Olson’s concepts (Olson 1967; 
                                                 
12 The socialization of children in schools and the political potential of syllabi are often subjects of debate, however. 
See for example Sheehan (2017). 
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Sharp 1973a; Tarrow 1994, 8-12). The eight conditions of inclusion speak to the universe of 
potential cases I address. 
Figure 2: Conceptualization of nonviolent contentious politics 
 
 
I make three decisions when phrasing nonviolent contentious politics in this terminology. First, 
I divide political and apolitical collective action. I wish to explicate that while many acts of 
collectives have the potential to become political, they are not necessarily so. Music groups, 
social clubs, sports teams and such are examples of this. Political collective actions are those 
concerned with supplying some sort of good, duty, or reward to a manifestly politicized group 
in society. Second, I separate contentious- from routine, institutionalized politics to highlight 
that political action sometimes happens outside the arenas of legislatures, courts, governments, 
parties, and NGOs (Tarrow 1994; Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2003). The omnipresence of 
such noninstitutionalized struggles for rights, duties, and goods make up much of the grand 
events political scientists are committed to studying, e.g. revolutions, democratization, 
extensions of suffrage, terrorism, riots – in short, it is when ordinary people without routine 
access to the political sphere occupy it that contentious politics happen. And while phenomena 
like voting and petitioning are often nonviolent and political, they are outside the domain of 
this thesis. This distinction accords with Sharp (1973a) and his six-fold separation of social and 
political action in conflicts, wherein nonviolent action is separated from peaceful, institutional 
conflict-solving (Sharp 1973a, 66).  
 Third, I partition nonviolent- from violent contentious politics. This is not a normative 
statement on violence, but motivated by the literature which finds different causes, mechanisms, 
and results depending on the strategies chosen by contentious actors to further their interests 
(e.g. Chenoweth and Uldfelder 2017; Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer 2018; Cunningham et 
al. 2017; Sharp 2012; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). I build on these findings by theorizing an 
Solid-edge boxes contain concepts of interest to the thesis, dashed-edge boxes do not. Characteristics I-VIII 
apply to solid-edge boxes and do not to dashed-edge boxes. 
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economic dimension of nonviolent action which possesses particular causal traits, at a lower 
level of abstraction “nonviolent action.”  
 A predominantly nonviolent campaign needn’t be entirely peaceful and civil, and 
nonviolence is not synonymous with pacifism, however (Sharp 1973a, 68). I would not consider 
damage to property or other non-person things violence, for one thing. There are strong reasons 
to call this type of behavior “violent” in some cases – hoarding food during famines is arguably 
a violent act, as is damaging agricultural land or people’s houses. Striking and damaging a 
company’s profits or blocking a road, while potentially causing multiple times the damage in 
monetary terms, are scarcely violent in themselves, however. This is because violence is a 
question of structural relations (Aitchison 2018). When used to challenge “certain objectionable 
forms of political domination” (2018, 667), Aitchison writes, it can be both morally defensible 
and be employed as a surrogate-, remedial-, or mobilizational tool in lieu of other channels of 
contestation. Coercion, meaning the interference in others’ choices by disincentivizing, forcing, 
or tricking them (Aitchison 2018, 668), is not necessarily violent. Simultaneously, persuading 
someone to voluntarily pursue a course of action can also be violent, for example by 
communicating the seriousness of a demand, which is the case with terrorism (Aitchison 2018; 
Pape 2005). The perpetrator and target of seemingly violent or nonviolent action is a critical 
contextual factor to adjudicate the justness of it. Empirically, few campaigns are completely 
violent or nonviolent, and adding the qualifier predominantly to nonviolence is necessary. Some 
margin of tolerance is needed to delineate between predominantly nonviolent and violent 
campaigns, although each concrete event can be strictly one or the other.  
4.3. Sharp’s methods of nonviolent action 
What characterizations are shared among different strategies of nonviolent contentious politics? 
Which courses of action distinguish them from each other? Sharp (1973b, xi-xviii) structures 
his list of tactics under the headings protest and persuasion; social noncooperation; economic 
noncooperation: (1) economic boycotts, (2) the strike; political noncooperation; and nonviolent 
intervention.  
 Firstly, Sharp (1973b, 117-119) defines nonviolent protest and persuasion as arguing 
for or against something; it may speak to an opponent or the public, and it is mainly 
communicative. They are distinguished from noncooperation and intervention by being 
primarily about expressing opinions or calling for action, but not exerting direct pressure or 
costs on an opponent or bystander. Yet they are distinctly political, as they are collective efforts 
rather than personal communication, and aimed at achieving a political goal and/or targeting a 
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politically potent audience (Sharp 1973b, 118). Sharp lists 54 methods of nonviolent protest 
and persuasion and points out that their efficacy differs according to their prevalence in a 
particular context, and that their prevalence is determined by sanctions and opportunities for 
collective and expressive action and speech (Sharp 1973b, 119). Examples of this type of action 
are picketing, wearing symbols or colors of political salience, protest meetings, public speeches, 
and parades (Sharp 1973b, 119-172).  
 Second, noncooperation is a refusal to continue particular relations. Sharp divides the 
methods of noncooperation into social-, economic-, and political noncooperation, based on 
what kind of relationships are discontinued (1973b, 184-185). Social noncooperation target 
relations between people or groups of people. While the aim of social noncooperation is 
political, the arena wherein action is taken is social, for instance refusing to socialize or behave 
normally with strikebreaking scabs or Nazi collaborators (Sharp 1973b, 185-189). Individuals 
or groups who have done something disagreeable become symbols of the political 
disagreement, and costs imposed upon them to sanction and deter such actions. The experiences 
of Norwegian women who were (allegedly) romantically involved with the occupying Nazi 
soldiers provide an extreme example, as they had their hair shaved, were labelled tyskertøs (lit. 
“German-slut”), and were ostracized for many years, as were with their children, called 
tyskerunger (lit. “German-kids,” pejoratively).  
 Economic noncooperation encompasses boycotts and strikes, which impose economic 
costs on a target. Boycotts are discontinuations of purchase, sales, or handling of goods from 
certain suppliers, while strikes involve ceasing labor activity, usually collectively and 
simultaneously, to disrupt production (Sharp 1973b, 219-221, 257-259). The common 
denominator is the economic impact imposed on an objectionable target, while the goal of the 
action may be economic, social or political (1973b, 219-221). Examples include the boycott of 
Israeli-produced goods by individuals and institutions to protest and deter the occupation of 
Palestine, the Chinese state boycott of Japanese goods in the early 1900s to protest Japanese 
policies, and the Icelandic Women’s Strike in 1975 to protest pay gaps and gender inequality. 
 Political noncooperation is the discontinuation of political activity, for example with 
police, the state, foreign states, parties and the like (Sharp 1973b, 285-286). The isolation of 
the Sweden Democrats from government negotiations in Swedish parliament after the 2014 
election and the expulsion of Russian diplomats from multiple countries following the 
poisoning of former Russian spy Sergej Skripal and his daughter Julia in 2018 are examples of 
political noncooperation. Political noncooperation imposes costs in different ways, for instance 
by creating legitimacy costs for parts of the state if citizens do not cooperate with them, or 
38 
 
economic and political costs on foreign governments when suspending diplomatic activity. 
 Lastly, nonviolent intervention is a category of methods directly effecting change, akin 
to direct action, commonly used by anarchists. Instead of sanctioning, deterring, or persuading 
others to pursue some course of action, nonviolent intervention directly hinders it, for instance 
by destroying anti-homeless architecture, squatting in unused homes to alleviate homelessness, 
or arranging lunch-ins in racially segregated restaurants (Sharp 1973b, 357-359). Sharp 
partitions the category into social, political, economic, psychological, and physical intervention 
(Sharp 1973b, 358). These subdivisions speak to the different targets and spheres in which 
intervention can be employed: social intervention by establishing new social norms, like 
treating Black people as equal to Whites in the 19th century US; political intervention by 
establishing parallel institutions like courts and parties; economic by creating cooperatives to 
lower prices; psychological by verbally harassing opponents; and physically by invading or 
trespassing politically salient institutions or companies (Sharp 1973b, 359-435).   
 The conceptualizations offered all possess causal utility for my research question, as no 
category or subcategory contains traits endogenous to democracy or democratic transitions 
(Gerring 2012b, 130-131). Several authors have argued and tested the hypothesis that the 
organization of civil society contributes to the evolution of social capital within a society which 
subsequently aids democratization and democratic consolidation (e.g. Diamond 1999; 
O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Putnam 1993; Teorell 2010). This is however not an issue of 
conceptualization, but formulations of the hypotheses I wish to test. Those before me who have 
argued the importance of civil society have not deconstructed nonviolent action and tested its 
components systematically but have often used independent variables like “civil society 
strength” and “organizational density” to correlate with the probability of democratization. The 
causal utility of Sharp, NAVCO’s and my own conceptualization of economic nonviolent action 
contain no elements of regime types and are exogenous to these concepts. 
 One issue with using the subdivisions of Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018) and 
Sharp (1973b) is that they are not so much categorizations of strategy as they are classes of 
methods by which strategies can be executed – tactics in military language. I have no 
expectation that campaigns will align to only one of these categories but hypothesize that a 
combination of different methods from different subcategories of nonviolent contentious action 
will be utilized for each struggle. Some combinations will probably be more common than 
others, and some more efficient. There is no reason to believe that there is an ideal “protest and 
persuasion” campaign which for some reason only use these methods to achieve their goals and 
refuse to employ noncooperation and intervention-techniques. However, I do believe that there 
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are distinct qualities possessed by economic strategies that alter the likelihood of 
democratization by inflicting costs on the regime. By theorizing these qualities and 
mechanisms, and by conceptualizing and measuring the concept of economic nonviolence, I 
hope to find a probabilistic relationship that answers the research question and provides relevant 
information to the research literature and to activists.  
5.  Methods 
To test the impact of economic strategies on the likelihood of democratization, I first construct 
a measurement model of economic strategies. I then use the resulting measure as my main 
independent variable to test whether movements using more economic strategies are more likely 
to achieve their goals than those who use them less. The advantages to using a measurement 
model compared with binary predictors13 from the NAVCO dataset are many, relating to 
reliability, validity, model fit, and parsimony. I use Bayesian item response theory to explore 
the relationships between the chosen variables for economic strategies and summarize them 
into a standardized, metric score. To test my hypotheses, I then use the score to estimate the 
causal effect of it on the likelihood of democratization in a logistic regression model, with 
appropriate control variables.  
5.1. Bayesian item response theory 
Measurement models take indicators of observed data that are thought to represent a 
multifaceted or unobservable concept and merge them together to form a new, metric variable 
representing the concept. This use of measurement models is called data reduction and the 
objective is to summarize the variation in the predictor variables with fewer numbers and thus 
achieve a more parsimonious regression model (Hair et al. 2014, 96-97). Treier and Jackman 
(2008) for example, take indicators from the Polity IV project and apply a measurement model, 
which allows them to assess the measurement error of the score, and to agnostically weigh the 
indicators – in short, an approach preferable to the arbitrary one used by Polity IV. My approach 
is similar: I use my chosen indicators of nonviolent tactics from NAVCO 3.0 and apply a 
measurement model which results in an ability-score for nonviolent campaigns’ use of 
economic strategies, or a summated scale of their strategy’s ‘economicness’.   
                                                 
13 The variables verb_10, verb_100 and verb_1000 are coded nominally, and simply using them as predictors in a 
regression would be equivalent to making dummy variables for each value. This is at best a profuse approach – 
having close to two hundred dummy variables as predictors would obfuscate the relationship between the variables 
and make it nearly impossible to make sense of the resulting coefficients, all controlled for one another. I therefore 
make dummy variables for each nominal category and make a measurement model using the 42 indicators of 
economic strategy.   
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 Several techniques for data reduction are available which can explore how variables 
related to economic nonviolent strategies covary. One way to reduce the number of variables 
used to measure a concept is item response theory (IRT; see Hair et al. 2014; Jackman 2008, 
2009; Jordana, Fernández-i-Marín, and Bianculli 2018). IRT-models require binary coding of 
a variables’ presence or absence and are mainly employed in psychometrics and related fields 
(Jackman 2008). The most common use in political science is for analyzing roll call- or judicial 
decision-data to reveal the latent ideological positions of senators and judges (see Clinton, 
Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Jackman 2001; Jackman 2008, 2009). Despite the omnipresence of 
binary variables and a multitude of potential uses, the method is unpopular in political science. 
The technique is particularly useful to alleviate some of the problems highlighted by Achen 
(2005) and Schrodt (2014), who lament the use of binary independent variables and its 
consequences for model fit.14  
 The core idea of a measurement model is to estimate a latent dimension from the 
observed data. A latent dimension as discussed above is a variable that is not directly 
observable, such as class or ideology. Obviously, observing the latent characteristics directly 
would be preferable, but this is often not possible. The benefits of a measurement model 
compared to creating an additive index or using proxy variables are many. First, measurement 
models allow the data to weight themselves, relieving the researcher of creating arbitrary 
weighting schemes (Achen 2005; Goertz 2006, 46-50). Weights must be justified with reference 
to the concept structure, and the default weighting schemes of taking the mean, median, or sum 
of the indicators constitute strong assumptions that are rarely theorized. While seemingly 
neutral and agnostic with regards to the distribution of the latent dimension, it can affect the 
results greatly (see  Hooghe et al. 2016; Treier and Jackman 2008). This is a point made by 
Treier and Jackman (2008), that while the aggregation rules of the Polity IV index are simple, 
they are also arbitrary. Using a measurement model is both more transparent and more neutral.
 Second, given some theoretical validity of the chosen indicators of a concept, 
measurement models enhance the confidence of subsequent regression models compared to 
those using proxy variables or ill-specified indexes (Achen 2005; Jackman 2008). Achen shows 
that small misspecifications, bad proxies, or adding or removing control variables can have 
huge impacts on regression analyses, making them almost useless and often uninterpretable. 
Achen (2005) and Schrodt (2014) both argue for parsimony in regressions, i.e. using few 
                                                 
14 The same can be achieved by factor analysis, although this method usually requires non-binary coding of 
variables, and treats model parameters differently in some respects (e.g. Fox 2010; Jordana, Fernández-i-Marín, 
and Bianculli 2018; Reckase 2009).   
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independent variables in a single regression model. By reducing indicators of a concept into a 
single measure with statistically determined weightings one is better equipped to perform 
hypothesis-testing analyses because much of the same variation is explained by the reduced 
measure and the model fit can be assessed more easily with fewer explanatory variables.  
 Measurement models like IRT are very similar to common regression analyses in that 
the objective is to estimate unknown parameters based on known data. Linear regressions are 
usually formalized as 
𝛾 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋 +  𝜎 
where γ is the observed data, the values of which are predicted using the estimated intercept α, 
and the estimated coefficient β of the observed predictor variables X. The residuals or 
unexplained variance are represented by σ. The key point is that the beta-coefficient is estimated 
based on observed data X and γ but is itself unobservable. In measurement models, the latent 
X is also estimated from the observed data γ.     
 For IRT models, imagine a class of students taking a maths test on addition. Their 
answers (γ) are marked as either correct (1) or incorrect (0) and recorded in a student-by-
question matrix (i by v). Based on this matrix of observed characteristics γ, it is possible to 
calculate each question’s difficulty parameter (β),15 discrimination parameter (α), and each 
student’s ability (θ).16 The difficulty of a question (βv) tells how likely it is that students get it 
right, given their ability (θi). A student that gets everything right will have high ability score, 
and questions that only the brightest get right are difficult.17 The discrimination parameter αv 
describes how good a question is at distinguishing between students; those questions that 
everyone gets right or wrong have a low discriminatory value, whereas those that separate 
students well are good discriminators. The students’ ability-score will represent their skill in 
addition, assuming that other skills are not required or are evenly distributed, such as reading 
and understanding text and numbers.   
 For my measurement model of economic strategies, I want to extract the abilities of 
different nonviolent campaigns to use economic strategies. Because each event in the NAVCO 
3.0 dataset is assigned only one strategy-indicator I need to aggregate temporally to produce 
                                                 
15 The name “difficulty parameter” is simply the test based IRT nomenclature and does not mean that variables 
with high difficulty scores are necessarily harder to “perform.” 
16 For those familiar with factor analysis, discrimination is equivalent to loading or weights, and ability is equal to 
factor scores, i.e. the measurement of the latent dimension in which I am interested.  
17 Some IRT models allow for a guessing-parameter, i.e. factoring in the likelihood that some respondent randomly 




variation in the data – a test with only one question taken by one student cannot reveal much 
about the class’ relative abilities and the questions’ difficulty or discriminatory value. I 
aggregate by the strategy-indicators’ maximum count by campaign-year. That is, I record 
whether they are present in a given year no matter how many events. This retains the 
dichotomous coding and allows the use of IRT.18   
 The worst consequence of this is that I lose a lot of data and observations. The number 
of observations shrinks from some 112.000 distinct events to 442 country-years, and because I 
aggregate by the maximum count of each dummy variable each year, I also lose the number of 
times a strategy is used. There are available methods that do not require all of this, which would 
be equally suited to my analysis, which I discuss in chapter 7.4.   
 Each nonviolent campaign thus takes a “test” in economic tactics each year. Campaigns 
either do or do not use a particular economic nonviolent tactic. Based on the data matrix of 
tactic presence or absence, the ability-score of each campaign-year is estimated, a score which 
communicates how “good” a campaign was at using economic strategies that year. The tactics 
which are common will have a low difficulty parameter and the campaigns which use few or 
only easy tactics will have a low ability score. I expect that the ability of a nonviolent campaign 
to use economic strategies helps explain transitions to democracy, and the ability score thus 
forms my main independent variable.   
 Why am I using a Bayesian framework for my measurement model, rather than the 
conventional frequentist one? The key reason is that my data are not representative of the 
population to which I would want to generalize my findings. As the NAVCO 3.0 data are 
explicitly not chosen randomly or with any pretense at randomness or representativeness of 
other countries, but rather because they are particularly eventful, this limits the applicability of 
frequentist confidence intervals and significance levels. Additional sampling from the 
population would probably yield very different results and alter the relationship between the 
variables (Jackman 2009, xxxi-xxxii; Schrodt 2014, 293). Breaking this particular assumption 
of representativity should always be a reason to at least evaluate the choice of frequentist or 
Bayesian methods (Fox 2010; Jackman 2009; Kruschke 2010; Schrodt 2014).   
 Using a Bayesian measurement model can improve the measurement model additionally 
by including the uncertainty of measurements in the analyses. Missing values for example, of 
which there are many in datasets on social movements, are utilized in estimating the uncertainty 
                                                 
18 An alternative approach would be to summarize the periodic occurrences of the indicators, so that a tactic used 
in five events counted as 5 rather than 1. This would require factor analysis for data summation, which is basically 
equivalent to IRT.  
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of the posterior probability distribution, which is a more appropriate response than the habitual 
listwise exclusion resulting in fewer observations (Fox 2010; Jackman 2009; Jordana, 
Fernández-i-Marín, and Bianculli 2018, 3).  
 My two-step plan of first formulating a measurement model and then using one of its 
parameters as an independent variable makes uncertainty very important. By stating my results 
as probability distributions, this uncertainty can be carried on through the process and inform 
the result better than a ninety-five percent credible interval can. Communicating the uncertainty 
of an estimate is an important part of evaluating the credibility of a piece of evidence. And as 
frequentist methods often do so in a limited way, for instance by deleting observations with 
missing values, I use Bayesian methods which do not hamper the communication of 
uncertainty. This way, the uncertainty of my measurement model (which is considerable, given 
the high degree of missingness from my variables) is carried on to the hypotheses testing phase. 
My item response model looks like Figure 3:19  
Figure 3: JAGS model for Bayesian IRT 
 
                                                 
19 The reason for this tiresome mathematical display is that there are no packages available in R that I am aware 
of with enough options and specification for me to execute this part of my research design. Furthermore, a few 
scholars have used similar models before me, which allowed me to learn a great deal about the maths behind the 
model (notably Curtis 2010; and most importantly Fernández-i-Marín 2019, who introduced me to IRT and JAGS 
in the first place; Jackman 2001, 2009; Reckase 2009). This particular model is adapted from the online appendix 
to Kruschke (2010), available at http://doingbayesiandataanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/12/bayesian-item-response-




What follows here is a restatement of the model in, hopefully, more understandable terms. First 
recall that the item response model is performed on a matrix of binary data, and estimates the 
parameters based on this matrix. I write the model in JAGS (Just Another Gibbs Sampler) and 
run it from R using the rjags package (Plummer 2018).   
 Line 3  signifies that the data (Y) for each cell are generated from a Bernoulli-
distributed20 probability parameter (pCorr). This means that the values of the cells take the value 
1 and 0 with the frequency they observably do. It is also a way of restricting the model to only 
consider outcomes between 0 and 1, as Bernoulli distributions only have two outcomes.   
 Line 4 and 5 state the regression model itself. The probability parameter for each cell 
equals the logit of the discrimination for the variable times the observation’s ability minus the 
variable’s difficulty. The logit is the natural logarithm of the odds rate for each value. The 
probabilities of the data, which are Bernoulli distributed, are given by the relations between 
parameters in the matrix, and these parameters are thus estimated based on the data. The ability 
is determined by how many ones are in the observation’s row, and the difficulty by how many 
are in the column. Rows with many ones have high ability, and columns with many ones have 
low difficulty. The ability of a column is based on how well the columns contribute to separating 
observations from one another.   
 Lines 7 and 8 specify that the ability scores are normally distributed with the estimated 
mean and standard deviations specified in lines 18 and 19, the mean is normally distributed 
around 50 and with a low precision parameter, the standard deviation uniformly distributed, 
with high precision. The precision specified in the priors is a measure of how certain the user 
is about the parameter taking the mean value and is interpretable similarly to variance. High 
precision values, such as the 50 used in line 18, means that I am quite uncertain that the mean 
is correct.   
 Lines 10 and 11 fix the difficulty parameter between 0 (easiest indicator) and 100 
(hardest indicator). The mean and standard deviation for the difficulty is fixed to 50. This is 
simply a constraint on the model which allows the other parameters of interest, discrimination 
and ability, to vary in relation to each other. The discrimination of each indicator is affected by 
the others’ discrimination, and each campaign-year’s ability does the same. The shrinkage 
which this relativity implies makes outliers less influential (Kruschke 2010, 175-176). Fixing 
the difficulty in this way has no negative consequences because the difficulty parameter itself 
is not an interesting quantity to the research question.     
                                                 
20 A Bernoulli distribution is one with a single experiment with two possible outcomes, where the probability of 
an event occurring (p) is between 0 and 1, and the probability of it not occurring (q) is 1 – p.  
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 Lines 13 and 14 specify the discrimination of the indicators and are similar to lines 7 
and 8, except that the priors for the mean and standard deviations in lines 16 and 17 are fixed 
at other locations with different strengths.   
 The priors are meant to be vague to allow the data to dominate the model because I have 
no similar measurement models to base my beliefs on. This is very much an explorative 
application and biasing the output with an unjustifiably strong prior would not be proper.  
5.2. Bayesian logistic regression 
The abilities of the campaigns to utilize economic strategies are then appended to my dataset to 
be used as my main independent variable in testing whether economic ability is related to the 
likelihood of democratization. I do this by estimating a posterior distribution for the logit of the 
economic ability variable, statistically controlling for GDP, tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, resource 
rent-to-GDP ratio, and net aid received.   
 Logistic regression is not very different from the standard linear regression model as 
discussed above. The main difference is that the dependent variable Y is dichotomous and not 
continuous. Rather than reporting the average amount of change in Y with a one-unit increase 
of X, as the coefficient in linear regression does, the output of interest is the average change in 
the natural logarithm of the odds rate-change in Y with a one-unit increase in X, i.e. the change 
in probability of observing a positive response one, controlled for the other covariates’ effects. 
This is a very difficult metric to interpret, and visual aids such as density plots of the coefficients 
are helpful. The logistic regression model furthermore limits the possible values of Y to be 1 
and 0, which eliminates the possibility that the outcome can occur more than all the time, which 
is logically impossible – a likelihood cannot be greater than one or less than zero.   
 The Bayesian method of hypothesis testing works as such: I inform the model of my 
prior beliefs about the location, shape, and precision of the posterior distribution, and the model 
subsequently incorporates the data so that the posterior distribution reflects a mixture of my 
beliefs and the actual data (Jackman 2009, xxvii). The posterior distribution is a probability 
statement about the parameter of interest, which allows me to answer my research question as 
an intuitive likelihood, for instance by saying that I am seventy percent certain that the logit of 
my ability score is positive, given my prior beliefs and data, and sixty percent sure that it lies 
in a certain interval.   
 The prior is a subjective statement on what I believe the truth of the parameter to be. 
Subjective probability refers rather to a state of mind than of the world, which means that 
different priors will be used by different researchers, and the results of an analysis will differ 
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based on it (Jackman 2009, 13-19). If a prior strongly states that a coefficient is exactly 5 and 
the data equally strongly say it is 15, the posterior distribution will center around 10 and be 
somewhat uncertain. A prior of 15 for the same data will however be reinforced and made more 
certain. Furthermore, the confidence lent to the prior matters. The stronger the prior, the less 
influence the data have on the posterior distribution. A weak prior, on the other hand, where 
little is known or believed about the location and distribution of the parameter, will influence 
the posterior distribution comparatively little – this is appropriate for hypothesis testing such as 
mine, where previous research is scarce.   
 Therefore, my prior confidence in the hypothesis is weak. I incorporate that weak 
confidence into the analysis with the prior. Only after reviewing the results of the analysis do I 
update my beliefs and answer the hypothesis. I will not, however, be certain that the resulting 
coefficient is an objective truth in the universe. Rather, I will be more certain about my 
hypothesis’ level of veracity. There is no objective law that determines how economic strategies 
work or under which circumstances, but there are trends or patterns which can be summarized 
to a regression coefficient. This is not the same as saying that the result of my analysis will be 
undeniably true, but that the data I have viewed should make me update my subjective idea of 
how important economic strategies are for regime transitions. A different, more convincing 
analysis can change it again by falsifying the hypothesis or changing the coefficient, for 
instance by incorporating a relevant covariate I have omitted.  
 The effect of something so unscientific as a researcher’s subjective beliefs on the result 
of a statistical analysis seemed to me at first irresponsible and arbitrary, but it touches on core 
ideals of the scientific method. To infer something about the world, we must compare our initial 
idea with observable data, and rationally update our beliefs to fit those data. Strong beliefs 
require strong observations to be disproven. Compared to the frequentist approach of requiring 
a p-value of < 0.05 to discard an improbable null hypothesis, the Bayesian incorporation of 
prior beliefs is rational and in many situations more appropriate than the assumption of repeated 
sampling  (Jackman 2009, 6-8).   
 Furthermore, stating the estimated regression coefficient as a posterior probability 
communicates the uncertainty of the estimation and provides information with which to update 
beliefs about the coefficient. The key output to interpret is the logit for every covariate, which 
when positive indicates that the likelihood of a transition to democracy increases with each unit 
increase in the covariate, while the others are held constant. Graphical depictions of the 
posterior distributions also communicate the shape, thereby allowing readers to evaluate the 
results in detail. The logistic regression model I use looks like Figure 4:  
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Figure 4: JAGS model for Bayesian logistic regression 
 
Line 3 states that the data Y, the dependent variable, are distributed the way they are. As in the 
IRT model, they are Bernoulli distributed into ones and zeroes, with the frequency q[i], i.e. as 
it is in the data. Lines 4 and 5 state the regression model, in which the logit of the probability 
with which the data take their values is determined by the coefficients of the covariates, beta[2] 
through beta[6], multiplied by the value of the observation. Beta[1] is the intercept, and not 
multiplied by a cell value.   
 Lines 7 and 8 specify the prior distribution for the betas, stating that they are normally 
distributed with location zero and precision one, which allows the data to dominate the posterior 
distribution. This is the point, as my actual prior knowledge of the relationship is weak. While 
I expect the coefficient to be positive and strong, this is more of a guess than a prior belief based 
on evidence, and I do not use a prior to represent that expectation.     
6.  Data 
To investigate whether economic strategies are better at producing democratic transitions than 
non-economic strategies, I need variables that reveal variation in tactics and strategies, and ones 
that document whether transitions to democracy occur.  I use what I consider state-of-the-art 
data-resources which fit the conceptual discussions above, and which allow me to answer the 
research question in a convincing and reproducible manner. Unsurprisingly, these qualities are 
not present in one ready-made dataset, and I therefore merge several datasets to supply control 
variables. Furthermore, a lot of data cleaning, aggregation, and amending is necessary. This 
process, along with the reasons for- and limitations of my choice of data and the fit between the 
data and the concepts they measure, are all detailed in the following sections, along with 
descriptive statistics. R-scripts for replication can be supplied on request. 
6.1. Data on nonviolent mobilization – NAVCO 3.0  
The very best quantification of strategic nonviolent mobilization currently available is, I think, 
the NAVCO 3.0 database (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). The dataset consists of 
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112.381 event-days, covering the years from 1991-2012 for 26 countries.21 My reason for 
choosing this dataset is primarily its relevance to the research question: It contains detailed 
information on the tactics used by political movements, which can be used to create a 
measurement model of strategy.   
 The data are sourced from Agence France Press (AFP), coded by research assistants 
under supervision, and tested for inter-coder reliability (see Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 
2018 for more details on the dataset). While I have a high degree of confidence in the coding 
itself (having found only a handful of errors in the attractive verb-variables), the fact that only 
one newspaper is used is a cause for concern. AFP is a large newspaper and highly regarded for 
quality journalism, but this does not necessarily remedy the potential bias in relying on one 
provider of stories to code. This is perhaps my greatest concern with using the NAVCO 3.0 
data, as the absence of data triangulation by using different sources may bias the collected data 
in some way, for instance by over- or underestimating numbers of participants, economic 
consequences, deaths, injuries and so on. The reliance on AFP therefore introduces a source of 
uncertainty to the data that needn’t have been there.   
 The sample is also unrepeatable. According to Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018, 
527-528) the dataset includes “[…] all events in a country for the entire period of study,” which 
means that all relevant events reported by AFP are recorded. Doing the data collection again 
would not alter the result save for some measurement error, and to speak of repeated sampling 
does not make much sense. Collecting data from other newspapers, time periods or countries 
would of course also be valuable but would represent a different population than NAVCO 3.0.
 Additionally, the actual news stories are not recorded by NAVCO 3.0, and only the title 
is present in the dataset. As the stories may be updated online after the coders have finished 
documenting them, this makes replication of the measurement difficult. More than once have I 
looked for articles to investigate a suspected coding mistake and failed to find the source. 
However, it is understandable that keeping track of and updating over 112.000 news stories is 
an enormously impractical and near-Sisyphean task.  
 I choose to use NAVCO version 3.0 rather than for example earlier NAVCO datasets, 
the European Protest and Coercion Data (EPCB), or the Minorities at Risk Organizational 
Behavior dataset (MORAB) because of NAVCO 3.0’s detailed coding of actors and actions. It 
                                                 
21 The authors describe the country sample as potentially “more ‘eventful’ than the global average,” a source of 
bias they discuss in an online appendix. The data furthermore do not cover the full twenty one-year stretch for all 




is relatively easy to summarize, separate, and manipulate the data. Furthermore, it is not 
regionally bound to a region like the EPCB22 or MORAB23 datasets, and it ends relatively 
recently, making it more likely that findings from the data are still relevant.   
6.2. Data-concept coherence 
A concept-illustration of Sharp’s categories alongside the variables of NAVCO 3.0 
(Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018, 529) for the corresponding concepts is depicted in  
Figure 5.24   
Figure 5: Sharp and NAVCO’s conceptualization of nonviolent strategies 
 
Sharp and NAVCO 3.0’s variables have some differences, marked by the edges of the boxes in 
Figure 5. In NAVCO 3.0, events are characterized by the category of nonviolent action, divided 
into protest and persuasion (subdivided into verbal persuasion and protest actions); non-
cooperation (social, political, economic-strike, economic-boycott); and political engagement. 
Both Sharp (1973b, 68) and Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018, 529) allow for variation 
differences in concentration or dispersion, or whether geographic distribution is a goal of the 
event, and for commission or omission, signifying whether an event is a performance of unusual 
or unexpected action, or a refusal to perform expected activities, respectively. The two sources 
thus have near-identical ideas on how best to conceptualize nonviolent action.  
 In addition, NAVCO 3.0 has several variables for more detailed description of the 
concrete actions performed in campaign events, which adds specificity and potential for 
accuracy and increased intension in the use of indicators or for analysis. These, unfortunately, 
do not accord perfectly with Sharp’s descriptions of nonviolent tactics but are adapted from the 
CAMEO codebook.25 While Sharp (1973b) describes detailed actions like sit-ins, protest 
                                                 
22 While the EPCB has detailed descriptions of the actual events similar to NAVCO 3.0 (verbs, what is being done 
to achieve something), its records are slightly older, documenting events from 1980-1985.  
23 MORAB also has an ethno-political inclusion criterion, which is not the focus of this thesis.  
24 While my overarching concept and contrast space differ somewhat from Sharp’s, as discussed in the previous 
section, the subdivisions conform. I argue that material destruction could fit into the physical- and economic 
nonviolent intervention-category. 
25 http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.html  
Dotted edges are only present in NAVCO 3.0, dotted-and-dashed edges only in Sharp’s typology. 
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disrobing and homages at burial places, Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018) have more 
general subcategories of action, such as “demonstrate for leadership change” or “obstruct 
passage to demand rights.” This is a challenge for the concept-measurement consistency, as the 
preferred deconstruction of the categories of nonviolent action drawn in Figure 5 would be one 
identical to the prime theoretician’s, Sharp. Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018) might 
however have more breadth in their measures than Sharp does, and that they are less sensitive 
to mobilizational culture and regional variations, which is advantageous for clustering and 
measuring success (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Gerring 2012b, 61-64; Sartori 1970).   
 Despite the sub-optimal fit between Sharp and NAVCO 3.0’s action-categories, I 
believe that the latter’s operationalization is more apt for data reduction. Sharp’s methods of 
nonviolent action are potentially culture-bound and are restrictively fine-grained. The first point 
is a problem, but the latter not necessarily so; with a proper aggregation-scheme, fine-grained 
data would be great. An issue with Sharp’s descriptions of methods is that they are inductively 
formed and therefore hard to systematically quantify, especially in retrospect. Newspapers for 
instance, which is the data source of NAVCO 3.0 (and many other projects) do not necessarily 
report that a strike was a “lightning strike” or a “limited strike.” The NAVCO 3.0 verb-variables 
which are theoretically representative of economic strategies and use them in my measurement 
model to form a variable for the degree of economic strategy used by democratization 
campaigns.  
 The indicators I use are listed in Appendix 10.1. They are chosen based on the NAVCO 
3.0 variable on economic noncooperation as described in Figure 5, and, because the economic 
noncooperation variable has a high degree of missingness, on reviewing the list of tactics 
recorded by NAVCO 3.0 and choosing those which seem relevant. I believe the chosen 
indicators are all relevant for the concept of economic nonviolent action conform to the 
conceptual discussions above.   
6.3. Data on democratization – Dictatorship and Democracy index 
For my dependent variable, I use the Dictatorship and Democracy (DD; Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland 2010) index’s measure of whether a transition to democracy happened in a certain 
year. The variable is binary and records a minimalist-procedural concept of democracy 
concerning the way representatives are chosen for legislatures and executives, and whether 
turnover in government has occurred since democratic elections were introduced. It is a 
somewhat controversial measure as many believe the concept of democracy cannot be 
summarized sufficiently a dichotomous measure. (For various views, see Bollen 1979; 
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Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Ghandi 2015; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski 
et al. 2000; Treier and Jackman 2008) As there is neither space nor need to delve into the 
discussion here, I only explain my reasoning for choosing the dichotomous measure briefly.
 Compared to metric measures of democracy, such as V-Dem, Polity IV or the Vanhanen 
measure, DD is appropriate for measuring changes from one regime to another. What concerns 
me and the research question for this thesis is the effect of economic nonviolence on the 
likelihood of transitions to democracy. Smaller changes in the level of democracy can be 
significant too – citizens in an anocracy may be pleased with policies that increase their 
democracy level from three to four despite their elections not being completely free. However, 
I prefer to consider political systems as bounded wholes and qualitatively different from non-
democracies for ontological reasons: political systems that do not have observably free elections 
do not meet the minimal requirements for the procedural conception democracy. It therefore 
makes sense to treat them as two distinct categories, although both democracies and 
dictatorships have varying degrees of inclusion and competition. I adhere to the advice of 
Sartori (1970) and consider democracies and autocracies as taxonomically different, rather than 
to choose one of the many continuous measures which exist. This is not a hindrance for 
investigating the effects of economic strategies however, as I compare the different effects of 
strategies on the likelihood for transitions. A continuous measure of democracy would require 
me to measure the average change in the level of democracy rather than the probability of 
transition and to make an arbitrary cut-off point for what constitutes a transition, whereas the 
DD measure does not.    
 For the purposes of testing my novel measure of economic strategies, however, a 
dichotomous measure of democracy is probably a poor strategic move. Metric, fine-grained 
measures carry more variation and finding a substantial average effect would be easier with for 
example Vanhanen’s 100-point measure. A dichotomous measure thus represents something of 
a hard test for the hypothesis. The advice of Sartori is however relevant again, as comparisons 
between qualitatively different classes of things cannot be meaningful (1970, 1036). 
Dictatorships and democracies cannot be meaningfully compared on a scale of 
“democraticness” because the former does not possess the quality, and as such belongs to a 
different class of political regime. Furthermore, the investigation into whether a variable 
increases the likelihood of a holistic transformation of political life rather than only incremental 
change is a far more interesting question and augmenting the research question in favor of a 
more easily discoverable finding seems problematic and, frankly, boring.  
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6.4. Dataset description  
The final dataset contains data for 26 countries, 12 of which have data for the full 1991-2012 
period (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2017). They are Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, 
Morocco, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.26 Aggregated 
by year, this gives a total of 442 observations.27 The coverage is somewhat geographically 
biased – no South American countries are included, and the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) are overrepresented, comprising half of the countries in the dataset.28 This means that 
I cannot reliably generalize my from this sample, as they are unrepresentative of the population 
of countries in the world.  
 Furthermore, I have amended the data substantially. The amendments consist largely of 
corrections for obvious coding mistakes, which were revealed by tabulating the verb-variables 
in the NAVCO 3.0 dataset. Mistakes such as observations coded with values that are absent 
from the codebook and therefore obviously coding mistakes, or categories with very few 
observations, were checked and re-coded where appropriate to values which I believe are 
correct.29 It should have no negative impact on the data quality, as I think I have been 
conservative when deciding what to change and what to leave as-is.   
 The actual variables on economic nonviolent strategies that I use are those which can, 
in some way or another, theoretically represent an economic focus. Reviewing the list of the 
verb-variables in the codebook, I selected those that were somehow linked to material economic 
activity, like strikes, sanctions, property destruction, and aid. Additionally, I referenced the 
economic noncooperation-variable in the NAVCO 3.0 dataset and used it as a guideline for the 
selection. The 42 indicators are listed in Appendix 10.1.   
 The data available from DD originally stop in 2008, which limits the applicability of the 
NAVCO 3.0 strategy data. Many protest events take place after this, particularly in the 
                                                 
26 Those not fully covered have data for these years: Bahrain (1994-2012), China (1991-92, 2010-12), Estonia 
(1991, 1999, 2002-2012), India (1991, 2011-12), Iraq (1999-2000, 2009-12), Jordan (1991, 1993-2012), Libya 
(1991-2000, 2002-2012), Madagascar (1991-93, 1995, 1997-98, 2000-06, 2009-12), South Korea (1992-96, 2012), 
South Sudan (2011-2012), Tanzania (1991-2006, 2008, 2010-12), Tunisia (1994-2012), Ukraine (1992-2012), and 
the USA (2007-11).  
27 It has been pointed out to me by one of the dataset authors that this aggregation does the many coders a great 
disservice. I agree but maintain that a considerable loss of information is a necessary trade-off when using a 
measurement model on event data.  
28 More than half if Sudan, South Sudan, and Pakistan are counted among them.  
29 The process of finding mistakes and recoding them produced an R-script of roughly 1000 lines of repetitive code 
which provides explanations for my changes and the code to repeat them. The process took more than a month to 
complete, as the original dataset is very large and the coding detailed. However, for the sake of veracity, causal 
utility, and reliable measurement, the process was necessary to get reliable results. The script with the suggested 




overrepresented MENA region. This is easily amended, however, as the coding rules for the 
DD dataset are commendably simple and easy to apply and so I have coded the four missing 
years myself.30   
 The variables which are interesting are those on regime transitions from autocracy to 
democracy, and vice versa. The coding of the years 2009-2012 supplied three additional 
democratic transitions, namely those of Madagascar in 2010, Tunisia in 2011, and Egypt in 
2012 (the latter was reversed by a military coup in 201331). This brings the number of transitions 
to democracy in the sample up to nine, and the number of regime transitions in total up to 12 
(Madagascar 2009, Pakistan 1999, and Sierra Leone 1997 are reversals of previous 
democratizations).  
 The scarcity of transitions is not an issue for the analysis. As I am interested in whether 
those campaigns which utilize have a higher likelihood of becoming democratic than those who 
do not, I want to infer merely the direction of the coefficient (although quantifying the effect of 
economic ability in probabilistic terms is also interesting).  With logistic regression analysis, I 
can estimate the probability of a democratic transition given high or low levels of economic 
ability, enabling me to answer the research question satisfactorily.  
 The four covariates which are not constructed using my measurement model (gdp, aid, 
tax2gdp, and rent2gdp) are all taken from the World Bank’s Databank (World Bank 2019a, b, 
c, d). The reason for this is the accessibility and open access licensing of their data. One issue 
is, again, the geographically biased presence of data, as well as the degree of missingness itself. 
Most worrisome is the tax2gdp variable, with nearly half of the observations missing values, 
and rent2gdp, with a quarter of the cases missing information. However, the variables with the 
highest degree of missingness are also those which are relatively hard to come by. The 
information is not missing at random, according to a few quick tests from the MICE imputation 
package in R (van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011), meaning that the missingness is 
correlated with the other variables in the dataset. To fix this I have run a quick imputation script 
to investigate whether the missing values matter very much. They do not, and the small 
differences in impact are discussed in chapter 7.2.  
                                                 
30 I was assisted by a fellow MA student who showed me a coding device of his own making, which greatly 
simplifies R data entry. Anyone who would like to try it should download the function, available here: 
https://github.com/Peder2911/ChildGotReeds  
31 The Egyptian transition is also debatable as a proper transition to democracy according to the rules of the DD 
democracy definition. I include it because it exemplifies a transition and the fall of a long-standing dictator, and 
because it is difficult to say whether the Morsi government would have yielded in the face of an opposition election 




 Table 1 describes the variables I use in my regression models. The first thing to note in 
Table 1 is that all the independent variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one.32 This affects the substantive interpretation of the coefficients so that 
they are less intuitive but more easily comparable. Unstandardized covariates can be interpreted 
directly – an increase in GDP of one dollar increases the likelihood of democratization by some 
value of the coefficient, or a decrease of one percentage point in tax revenue-to-GDP lowers 
the likelihood of democratization by some coefficient. With standardized coefficients, this is 
no longer possible (unless the variables are transformed back). Now, the interpretation of 
coefficients is that an increase of one standard deviation in the covariate changes the likelihood 
by the value of the coefficient. Because the ability-score is not directly interpretable anyway, 
and it is the independent variable of interest, this loss of intuitive interpretability is 
inconsequential. For the control variables it is important, however, to point out that the 
coefficients no longer correspond to changes in the units, but in the number of units 
corresponding to a standard deviation. 
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The upside is that the coefficients are directly comparable. Unstandardized variables of GDP 
may make sense on their own, but which is the more important predictor: a 0.00002 size 
coefficient for a one-dollar increase in GDP, or a 0.006 coefficient for a one-percentage-point 
                                                 
32 That is, I have subtracted the mean and divided by the standard deviation. A standard deviation is the average 
distance to the mean, or variance squared.  
33 This is the output of the Bayesian IRT model. The indicators used to estimate the measure are too many to 
summarize in the text here but can be viewed in Appendix 10.1.  
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increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio? Difficult to say. Standardized coefficients can be compared 
directly, as an increase of one standard deviation means the same for every variable. The 
coefficients come to represent the average change in the likelihood for democratization with an 
increase of a standard deviation, and thus weights the variables equally in a regression, rather 
than overestimating the importance of variables with high values, such as GDP or net aid 
received.  
 The values presented in Table 1 are worth discussing, as they reveal how they are 
distributed. The dependent variable, transition to democracy (ttd) is straightforward – it is a 
binary variable, recording whether a country-year saw a transition to democracy. It is right-
skewed with only nine positive observations in the dataset and thus has a low mean and standard 
deviation.    
 Ability, my main independent variable and output theta-parameter from the IRT model, 
is skewed slightly to the left but is close to normally distributed. A high number of observations 
have ability-values near zero, however, and a few observations have very high or low scores – 
six observations have ability scores over three standard deviations from the mean, and 329 
observations – roughly 74 percent – have scores which are equal to- or less than one standard 
deviation from the mean. A perfect normal distribution would have 68.27 percent within one 
standard deviation of the mean, which means that Ability is crowded in the middle and has thin 
tails.  
 Next, all the control variables are skewed to the right, i.e. that they cluster below the 
mean. This affects the gdp variable most severely, whose median is close to the minimum value. 
The maximum value is close to nine standard deviations from the mean, meaning the richest 
countries in the sample are extremely rich compared to the rest. Unsurprisingly, those countries 
with GDP above three standard deviations are China and the US in 2010-12 and 2007-11, 
respectively. The same pattern is clear in the aid variable, albeit less severely. Nine country-
years have values over three standard deviations from the mean, and Egypt in 1991 is over six 
standard deviations from the mean. Rent2gdp is similar also, but the high numbers are spread 
out more, resulting in a less steeply sloped distribution. Tax2gdp is closer to a normal 
distribution than the other control variables but does have a high number of missing values 
(215) as nearly half of the observations do not have data on the percentage of tax revenue 
compared to GDP.   
 These skewed distributions could mean that removing outliers would be beneficial to 
the analysis. Removing extreme values such as the GDP of China and the US may reveal 
previously obscured and patterns in the data and accentuate interesting effects.   
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 Additionally, it is worth mentioning that there are no considerable correlations between 
the variables in the dataset. The strongest correlation is between the resource rent-to-GDP ratio 
and the tax-to-GDP ratio, which is at .388. This is not a worrisome value but excluding one of 
the variables could potentially alter the results and illuminate other relationships in the analysis. 
The second strongest correlation is between ability and aid, at .237.   
 I further content myself with these five explanatory variables (at the most) in an attempt 
to limit the garbage can model-problems emphasized by Achen (2005) and (Schrodt 2014). 
They both phrase the issues better than I can, so I do not reiterate their points here. Suffice to 
say that overstuffing a regression model with covariates makes the results nearly impossible to 
analyze and investigate and that three covariates are usually neither too few nor too many to 
present a credible result.34 
7. Results and discussion 
My expectations for my models are as follows. First, I expect that the Bayesian item response 
model will yield enough variation with which to summarize the variables for economic tactics 
into a single variable. The undesirable result of no variation is equivalent to a regression 
coefficient being indistinguishable from zero. It is however possible to use a low-variation 
measurement model for data reduction; the central tendency of the estimates can vary a great 
deal despite high uncertainty. It is of course preferable to construct a variable in which the 
indicators have discrimination parameters which are distinguishable from each other, as this 
makes the specification of the model easier. If the discrimination parameters overlap, how can 
one separate those which contribute to the ability score and those who do not?   
 Second, I expect that economic ability is positively related to the likelihood of 
democratization. I believe the dependent variable will be negatively related to all my control 
variables: gdp, aid, tax2gdp, and rent2gdp. All are indicative of state capacity, albeit in different 
ways. This means that as I add control variables to the regression model, the effect of economic 
ability on the likelihood for democratization should shrink. I will investigate the relationships 
between the variables to better interpret the changes and supply various specifications of the 
model to tap it for information. Furthermore, I discuss model diagnostics which aid in the 
interpretation of the models.    
                                                 
34 According to Schrodt, I would probably be better off if I combined the variables for tax-ratio and GDP into a 
stability-measuring variable and the rent-ratio- and aid-variables into a variable for economic dependence or 




7.1. Bayesian item response model 
In this section, I report the findings on two of the parameters from the IRT model, namely the 
item discrimination alpha for every variable, and the ability score theta for every observation. 
The item discrimination of a variable describes how much it contributes to the resulting ability 
scores, i.e. how much of the variance in the data is explained by that single variable (Fox 2010, 
114-115; Jackman 2009, 455). Higher item discrimination values therefore signify more 
important variables. Given that I have fixed the item difficulty parameter delta, both the alpha- 
and theta scores are constrained to a certain interval. This means that the numeric scores will 
be low for the alpha scores, but the size matters less than the slope. The expected result for the 
alpha parameters is that they are distinct from zero, and that they contribute differently to the 
variance explained by the latent ability score theta (Fox 2010; Jackman 2009; Kruschke 2010). 
 For the ability score parameter theta, which is the latent variable which I argue 
determines the likelihood of using economic strategies, I also expect a slope. Some nonviolent 
campaigns should be more skilled in economic strategies than others or have access to resources 
others do not. Higher theta values represent greater “economic ability.” Again, because of the 
fixed item difficulty parameter delta, the values are unimportant, and I have standardized the 
resulting values to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in any case, so numerical 
values do not matter for the evaluation of the model.   
  I run the model as specified in chapter 5.1 above, with sampling parameters as follows: 
1000 adaptive- and burn-in iterations 1.000.000 iterations, thinning every ten iterations, with 
two simulation chains,35 and I use the Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator for 
sampling from the posterior distribution. The resulting alpha-parameter estimates are displayed 
in the caterpillar plot in Figure 6.36  
 The distribution of the discrimination parameter alpha shows that all indicators 
contribute to the model, and the indicators are distinguishable from each other to some degree. 
The seemingly low values on the x-axis result from the fixed difficulty-parameter. There is a 
significant deal of overlap between the indicators, which means that each variable does not 
contribute very much and that there is uncertainty about the location of the values. However, 
none of them have highest probability distributions (HPDs) which cross zero, which is striking 
                                                 
35 Using two chains makes the process somewhat more reliable when the chains with different starting points 
converge on the same value. It does however require more computational power and time. The other sampling 
parameters for the simulation are chosen based on trial and error where I have found a combination which is not 
too slow, but which delivers the expected convergence.   
36 The labels for the parameters are prohibitively difficult to alter, and I have therefore listed the indicators and the 




given that I specified the prior with the most likely location being very close to zero. The scores 
tend to become more uncertain the farther they are from zero, which may reflect that those who 
contribute more to the model are simultaneously those who deviate from the prior. Their 
posterior probability distributions may be “flattened” by the prior and given too high credible 
intervals relative to the strength of the data.  
 
Figure 6: Highest posterior densities for alpha par ameter  
It is worth noting that the Bayesian credible intervals are analogous to frequentist confidence 
intervals. The difference is that the credible interval incorporates information from the prior 
and that the credible intervals are fixed, not random (Jackman 2009, 26-28). The interpretation 
is similar, however, as the credible intervals represent the probable region where the value is 
located based on the data but does not assume that repeated sampling is possible or realistic.
 The posterior distribution of the theta parameters is very interesting. It is displayed as a 
caterpillar plot in Figure 7 below. First, the slope of the scores is good, and the estimates are in 
fact different from one another. A uniform buzz around zero would mean that the scale was 
invariant, and therefore useless as an independent variable for hypothesis testing. Variation is 
required to explain variation, and while the number of transitions to democracy is low, it is all 
the more important to have some separation between low- and high-ability campaign-years to 
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explain that scarce variation. Note that the y-axis is unreadable because over 500 parameters 
are estimated. 
 
Figure 7: Highest posterior densities for theta parameter  
Second, the fact that the lower values are more uncertain than the high ones is not odd, given 
the prior. It is possible that the same “flattening” by the prior occurs here, and that values that 
would be closer to the prior given stronger data are disadvantaged, and that the very low values 
are simply less certain in the data. Indeed, this is not unlikely at all, given the type of data I am 
using. There are many campaigns which use few economic tactics, and as such are difficult to 
place in relation to the others who do the same. Additionally, my aggregation scheme of 
counting the mere presence or absence of a tactic in a given year entails a loss of information 
and therefore contributes to the uncertainty in the ranking and scoring of the parameters. 
 The most important point to take away from the ability scores from the IRT model is 
that it is statistically feasible to construct a measure of strategy in this way and get meaningful 
results from the posterior. The resulting scale measures the degree to which campaigns use 
economic strategies in political contestation. Figure 7 shows that most receive low scores, and 
as such do not use or use only low-item discrimination tactics. Some campaigns use a large 
degree of economic strategies, and it is reasonable to infer that these possess skills and resources 
which allow them to do this, but which other campaigns lack. It is highly possible to use this 
constructed measure of economic strategy as the dependent variable in a regression to figure 
out which phenomena contribute to the differences. For example, are movements’ class 
composition linked to economic strategy? My measure of economic strategy may indeed be a 
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link relevant for Dahlum (2018), who investigates whether class composition and size of 
movements are linked to democratization. Likewise, my measure could, given more expansive 
data, constitute a causal, action-centered variable between the structural antecedents of Skocpol 
(1979) and  Moore (1966), or an antecedent to the cost of repression-concept of Dahl (1971).  
 It remains to see whether there is a relationship between this score and the likelihood of 
democratization before these bold claims can be made. First, however, the scale should be 
mapped to some cases to evaluate the validity of the measure. Does the model make sense as 
an inference from observation to measurement?   
 I have argued above for the increased use of measurement models in political science, 
and for the NAVCO 3.0 variables being appropriate for data reduction through IRT. The 
validity of the measure should however be tested (Adcock and Collier 2001; Jackman 2008). 
An obvious approach for evaluating the validity of the resulting variable is to compare it to 
cases in which economic strategy has been used, and simply seeing if the numbers match the 
qualitative description.37 However, few cases of prominent economic strategy exist on which 
to test the limited findings. This is a feature of the knowledge gap I attempt to fill: my research 
question is motivated by the lack of literature which treats attacks on state financial capacity.  
 A couple of examples can illustrate the validity, however. First, Nepstad (2011, 127) 
argues that the Kenyan campaign against the Moi dictatorship in the late eighties and early 
nineties succeeded in withholding material resources, a concept which is close to my concept 
of economic strategies. If the Kenyan campaign prohibited the state from using a set of material 
resources, some spike in economic strategy should be observed. However, the years are too 
early to be included in the dataset, as Moi announced elections in 1992 after facing resistance 
for several years, and most significantly so in 1990. The 1991 economic ability for Kenya is 
however not distinctively high. The peak years are 1997, 1998 (the year of transition to 
democracy), and 2008 (a year of intense protest after a disputed presidential re-election), ability 
scores being 1.5, 1.2, and 2.7 standard deviations above the mean of the dataset, respectively. 
This is however a weak test, as Nepstad (2011, 101-102) puts the height of resistance before 
the dataset starts recording.   
 A second example which provides a better test is the Occupy movement in the US in 
2011 and 2012. Here, thousands gathered all over the country to protest inequality, faux 
democracy, and capitalism. The goals of the campaigns were famously vague, and their 
methods directionless: Gene Sharp (2011) criticizes the movement for this, and stated that 
                                                 
37 Comparing it to previous quantitative measures, i.e. a test of convergent validity (Jackman 2008), would be 
better. I am however not aware that any such measures exist.  
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”They don’t have any specific demands or a clear objective” and “If they think they will change 
the economic system by simply staying in a particular location, then they are likely to be very 
disappointed.” This is hardly controversial; the Occupy movement has so far had little impact 
on the politics or economy of the US. However, the year 2011 stands out as a particularly strong 
year for economic strategies in the US, scoring 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. This is 
a large increase from the other years and provides a stronger test of validity.   
 Thirdly, Tanzania is an interesting case in which protest has usually been high in 
election years. My measure of economic strategies counts 1 and 1.1 standard deviations above 
the mean in 2000 and 2005, which would seem to weakly validate my measure. Every other 
observation for Tanzania in the dataset has values either close to zero or below the mean.  
 A line plot of the economic ability scores theta for Kenya, Tanzania, and the US is 
visible in Appendix 10.4, showing the trends described above. These three cases of convergence 
between my measure and the qualitative examples confirm the validity of the measure weakly. 
Despite wanting to test the validity of the measure more formally with other measures, these 
convergence-tests and the content validity of the concept as discussed in chapter 4 is all that is 
available to me (Jackman 2008). Closer knowledge of the countries covered would supplement 
the convergent validity, but I believe the content validity is sufficiently strong to justify the 
limited tests of convergence-reliability (see Adcock and Collier 2001).  
 It is important to keep in mind that the scores are relative to every other observation and 
variable included in the dataset. Removing one of either makes the entire score different 
because every cell is involved in estimating the parameters. An expected high value relative to 
a single country’s history may not be high on the score at all, because it may be comparatively 
low in the entire dataset. This is because the IRT takes the entire data matrix as its starting point 
and does not account for variation in time and space; the country name- and year-labels are not 
part of the IRT analysis. Each observation does get its appropriate score which likely does make 
sense, but they are not absolute and do depend on the rest of the matrix.  
7.2. Bayesian logistic regression 
My expectation is that economic strategies should be positively related to changes in the 
likelihood of democratization. To test it, I use a JAGS model for Bayesian logistic regression. 
The powerful graphics packages which take JAGS-outputs as their input is the main reason for 
this, as several packages provide basic Bayesian logistic regression. They demand much less 
work but are harder to manipulate and often come with sub-par graphical functions. The 
ggmcmc package from Fernández-i-Marín (2016) makes great use of the ggplot2 package and 
62 
 
supplies brilliant and easily interpretable graphics.   
 I run the model with 100.000 iterations, 1000 adaptive- and burn-in iterations, thinning 
every five iterations, two chains, and with the Mersenne-Twister random number generator. 
The parameters of interest for the hypothesis testing are all the beta-parameters in the analysis, 
i.e. the coefficients for each of the variables plus the intercept, along with their standard 
deviations as a measure of uncertainty. The results for the beta parameters are displayed in 
Figure 8.38 
  
Figure 8: Mean beta coe fficients for covariates  
The intercept at -4.1 shows that there is very little chance of a country democratizing in the first 
place. This is expected because there are only nine transitions to democracy recorded in the 442 
country-year dataset. All the control variables are negative at the mean, but all reach positive 
values by the 97.5th percentile; the standardized rent-to-gdp ratio is just positive at the 75th 
percentile. Increases in the control variables then decrease the likelihood of democratization, in 
accordance with the hypotheses. The fact that the tax-to-GDP ratio is the most acutely negative 
control variable may indicate that it is a proxy for government capacity rather than 
responsiveness to citizen demands. The same theoretical expectations are true for the other 
variables; increases in resource rents, foreign aid, and GDP decreases the likelihood of 
democratization on average.  
 Notably, the richest countries in the sample are the US and China, the former of which 
is already a democracy, the latter famously stable (although the same was true of GDR in the 
                                                 
38 The shapes of the posterior distributions of the beta-parameters are visible in Figure 16, chapter 7.4.3.  
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late 1980s). Removing the ten observations in which the US and China are recorded changes 
the sign of the GDP coefficient and gives a mean coefficient size of 0.335. The variable still 
has credible intervals that cross zero, and the removal of the outliers does not affect the ability 
score’s coefficient noticeably (from .7003 with outliers to .7063 without). The other covariates 
are similar, too. The outlier-free model does however conform to the Most General Finding 
(sic) in political science, namely that democracy and wealth are positively correlated (e.g 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Bernhard 2016; Bollen 1979; Diamond 1992; Fukuyama 2016; 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000).   
 The ability-score from the IRT model, which measures economic strategy, is 
consistently positive, however. The credible interval does not cross zero, which means that any 
amount of economic strategy increases the likelihood of democratization. The mean coefficient 
is 0.7, and it reaches 1.26 at the 97.5th percentile. This is a considerable size, which confirms 
the hypothesis and answers the research: There is a positive relationship between economic 
strategies and the likelihood of democratization.  
Table 2: Odds for covariates 














Translated into odds, the coefficients look like in Table 2. Economic ability contributes 
significantly to the likelihood of democratization, with a change in odds of nearly 2.1. This 
means that an increase in economic strategy of one standard deviation more than doubles the 
chance of a country experiencing a transition to democracy in the same year.   
 The odds of the control variables are all below one, meaning that increased control 
variable values lead to decreased likelihoods of democratization. Most of the odds for the 
control variables are not very strong however: the tax-to-GDP ratio, the strongest of the 
covariates, reduces the likelihood of democratization by forty percent; GDP by thirty-five 
percent.   
 The impact of imputation is small.39 The odds rate for the economic ability variable 
changes from 2.1 to 2.04, which is negligible. The credible intervals of the control variables do 
shrink however and make all consistently negative. The means do not change noticeably, but 
simply explain more of the variation which in the non-imputed version is accounted for by the 
                                                 
39 The imputation scheme I used is the standard mice command, with m=16, maximum iterations = 100, and the 
predictive mean matching (pmm) method. The imputation process could be specified very much more 
appropriately but suffices to demonstrate that the missing values matter little.  
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ability score.    
 Furthermore, ANOVA-testing several specifications of the regression model with 
different combinations of the covariates yield only slight differences in explained variance. The 
model with all five variables has 70.71 percent residual deviance, while every other 
specification has a little more. None of the differences are significant in a frequentist ANOVA 
test between the models however, which suggests that the control variables do not contribute 
much to the explained variance. This means that the most parsimonious and appropriate 
regression model for the research question may be the one with only the ability-variable and 
that the control variables are only complicating the result. This does seem to be the case, as the 
coefficient and credible intervals change very little both for the intercept and the ability 
variable.  
 In the model with only ability as a predictor, the coefficient for the variable takes a value 
of 0.6573, which is a small decrease in size. This means that the control variables make the 
relationship stronger, signifying that some of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by them. The fact they strengthen the effect of ability accords with their negative 
coefficients: the control variables contribute mainly to predicting non-transitions, as they 
correlate negatively with transitions to democracy. They thus predict mainly zeroes, while 
ability is positively correlated with transitions and is more closely related to the nine transitions 
in the dataset.    
 Furthermore, I have performed a frequentist logistic regression of my model, presented 
in Appendix 10.2. It displays precisely the same trends as the Bayesian one, albeit with slightly 
different values for the coefficients. In the frequentist regression, the ability-coefficient is 
stronger than in the Bayesian one, and it is significant at the five-percent level. Additionally, 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit-test provides no evidence of poor fit for the Bayesian 
regression model, with a p-value of .77 and x2-value of 4.9. The test is vulnerable to the number 
of groups specified (Hosmer et al. 1997), but altering the number of groups makes no substantial 
difference to the result.   
 It seems that the logistic regression has yielded results which are both stronger and more 
robust than I expected them to be. The research question is answered positively, and for the 
limited post-Cold War data sample available there has been a marked effect of economic 
strategies on the likelihood for democratization. Increased use of economic strategies equal to 
one standard deviation more than doubles the likelihood of a transition to democracy.   
 By viewing the cases in which transitions have occurred, it is easy to see that none of 
the cases display very low scores on the economic strategy measure. Table 3 lists the country-
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years in which a transition to democracy has occurred. Every transition except that in 
Madagascar in 1993 has economic ability scores above the standardized mean of zero. Five of 
the nine transitions have scores above the 3rd quartile or 0.730, and none are below the 25th 
quartile of -1.19.  
Table 3: Transition years and standardized economic ability scores 
Country Year Economic ability 
Madagascar 1993 -0.740 
Sierra Leone 1996 0.356 
Kenya 1998 1.189 
Sierra Leone 1998 1.627 
Mexico 2000 0.273 
Pakistan 2008 1.568 
Madagascar 2010 0.347 
Tunisia 2011 2.057 
Egypt 2012 2.568 
 
Obviously, this relationship is a probabilistic one. Nothing in the analysis suggests that a high 
level of economic strategic action necessarily makes a state transition to democracy. But the 
high increase in likelihood still testifies to the potency of the relationship, and that economic 
strategies may be a good strategic choice for social movements.   
 These findings suggest that an action-centered approach to democratization may provide 
a link between structural or actor-centered approaches and regime characteristics. The effect of 
economic strategy on the likelihood for democratization is on a less abstract level than many 
previous analyses such as Dahl (1971), Moore (1966), Skocpol (1979), Przeworski et al. (2000), 
and may provide links between democracy and its antecedents previously unexplored 
quantitatively. My analysis thus provides valuable insights and fills a knowledge gap for both 
the democratization literature at large and the nonviolence literature in particular.  
7.3. Discussion 
My findings are important for several reasons. First, they speak to the literature on nonviolent 
strategy and democratization and fill an important knowledge gap. Second, my use of item 
response theory exemplifies the applicability of measurement models for data reduction in 
situations where the available data are very fine-grained. Third, the findings show that Bayesian 
methods for hypothesis testing are accessible, easily interpretable, and more appropriate than 
frequentist methods when dealing with inherently unrepresentative data whose repeated 
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collection is impossible. Fourth, I supply potentially valuable information for activists by 
providing a probabilistic framework for what to expect when using different strategies to 
democratize a country. Fifth, my conceptual discussion in chapter 4 enriches the interpretation 
of the results by situating them in a broader context and provides grounds for new veins of 
research.  
 First, the literature on nonviolent strategy has found important and reliable relationships 
between strategy and outcomes of contentious politics. The best of these findings is that 
provoking defections from the security forces is an almost sure-fire way to win such a conflict 
(e.g. Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011, 2015; 
Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In essence, this speaks to the causal utility inherent in Weber’s 
definition of a state as the organization with a monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1958). 
This violence-monopoly is the state’s foremost source of power. I have argued that it is likely 
effective to target its other sources of power. With reference to Schumpeter’s definition of a 
state as the organization with a monopoly on legitimate taxation (Schumpeter 1991[1919]) – 
arguably the source of violent power in the first place – I have found that states are also 
vulnerable to attacks on their economic capacity. Nepstad (2011), using a comparative design, 
found no deterministic pattern between the removal of material resources from a state and 
nonviolent success. I have found a strong probabilistic one.   
 This is indeed a novel finding. No analysis of which I am aware has tested a similar 
hypothesis with quantitative methods as I have, and none have attempted to summarize the 
characteristics of nonviolent campaign strategies with measurement models. These approaches 
are fruitful, reproducible (with enough computing power…), and relevant. The NAVCO dataset 
is indeed new, and so the level of detail in the data collection efforts and the work it must have 
taken cannot be exaggerated. The new dataset has obviously not been analyzed to exhaustion 
yet and provides a great point of departure for just the kind of novel, knowledge-producing 
efforts political science must produce.   
 Crucially, the nonviolence literature should increasingly focus on strategy and the 
concrete actions which promote democratization. I have made one step in that direction, but 
scarcely enough to rely upon for anyone risking death or severe repression. The relationship 
between strategy and state action must be vigorously investigated both quantitatively and 
qualitatively to be able to write blueprints for democratization. Sharp (2012) has done most in 
this regard. His advice is more general than that which I can give. However, the nonviolence 
research community should pay attention to strategy both in the aggregated case, as I have, and 
in the very concrete sense, investigating individual cases, interrelations between different 
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strategies and tactics and their efficiency.   
 Additionally, my findings identify a possible vein for new research, namely causes of 
different strategies. Different strategies may spring from different structural factors or actor 
compositions, so my findings may identify a link between these antecedents and 
democratization. This is not trivial and can inform future research on both nonviolence and 
democratization.  
 Second, I have used the NAVCO 3.0 dataset in a novel and interesting way (Chenoweth, 
Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). Despite the various shortcomings of the data (which the authors 
themselves highlight in the accompanying article, and which I have amended to a degree), it is 
unequaled in detail. While I have made short work of that detail with my aggregation schemes, 
I believe that such fine-grained event data are very attractive for use in measurement models. 
The verb-variables from the NAVCO 3.0 dataset provide a great starting point for quantitative 
analyses of strategy, and I believe my approach is a fecund one to be developed further with 
other techniques, datasets, and hypotheses.   
 Third, making quantitative inferences about macro-level phenomena with data which 
are neither random samples nor experiments with Bayesian is both appropriate and accessible. 
Many have pointed this out before me and highlighted the potential gains of being armed both 
with frequentist and Bayesian tools of analysis (e.g. Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010; 
Jackman 2001, 2009; Schrodt 2014). In my analysis, it is meaningless to ask how likely it is 
that the data are anomalous compared to the population. The NAVCO 3.0 authors write 
themselves that the data are drawn from particularly eventful countries and make no pretense 
to generality (Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis 2018). It is also uninteresting to formulate a 
null hypothesis with which to compare such an anomalous sample. While the nonviolence-
literature is methodologically sophisticated compared to much of contemporary political- and 
social science and we are acutely aware of these points, it is worth reiterating to justify my 
choice of methods.   
 Fourth, my findings are potentially important for people wishing to overthrow dictators. 
The empirical fact that in my dataset the odds of democratization doubles when using economic 
strategies is valuable information to democrats. Given that they have the resources and skills to 
do so, it is advisable to attempt to target the state’s economy in one way or another. Strikes, 
blockades, divestment, economic sanctions, and property destruction are, in some here-
unexplored combination, tactics which increase the likelihood of democratization. What the 
resources and skills needed to perform these types of actions are, I have not explored. There are 
no notable correlations between economic ability and my control variables save that net aid 
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received has a 23.5 correlation coefficient. What causes economic ability can be explored by 
future research.   
 I also think it is very likely that the efficiency of economic strategies of nonviolence is 
contingent upon other factors which I have not accounted for. For one thing, which strategies 
the state employs to counter its opposition is bound to be important. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the Panamanian dictator Noriega resisted protests consisting of a third of his 
subjects. This is probably not attributable only to his involvement with drug smugglers and 
foreign autocrats, but to some more concrete action taken. It is unlikely that the Kapp putsch 
could withstand protest for very long given the enormous opposition from all parts of society, 
but perhaps the coup could have lasted longer with some state-strategy. And no doubt the East 
German regime could have done more to dissuade emigration, even without abandoning its 
socialist principles entirely.  
 Moreover, different structural factors are likely to affect my findings. Many things other 
than the revenue sources of states differ in my sample of states. They all have different political 
regimes, religious and ethnic make-ups, climates, foreign relations, histories, colonial heritage, 
and many other differences. (This is partly the reason why a subset of states is not representative 
of the state population.) Different analyses of different such relationships are necessary to create 
a reliable theory (sic) or even a generalizable relationship of economic nonviolent strategy and 
democratization. My results should be interpreted with caution by anyone seeking to practice 
nonviolent action in an autocratic context.     
 Fifth, my findings provide support for an action-focused vein in quantitative political 
science which bridges much of the theory and empirical findings on democratization, 
nonviolence, and regime stability. My conceptual discussion has situated the findings in a 
contentious politics-context and my theoretical discussion has provided arguments for why and 
how economic nonviolent strategies should affect democratization. Combined with the 
theoretical discussion on state behavior- and stability, my approach thus takes a step toward an 
action-perspective to connect structural, institutional, strategic, and actor-centered explanations 
of transitions to democracy. This advances the logical economy in the field and encourages 
researchers to move a step down the ladder of abstraction and look more directly at what is 
being done by activists. It also brings the quantitative knowledge closer to the qualitative 
literature by focusing on variables which are particular for every case yet generalizable, and 
which lie close to the concrete causal mechanisms of change.  
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7.4. MCMC model diagnostics 
It is necessary to investigate whether the simulation-based methods have converged and 
produced reliable results. The most important form of model diagnostics for Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC)-based simulation models is convergence. The model specified above 
samples from the posterior distribution and estimates the likelihood that the data exist in a 
certain range. This simulation of samples uses a random number generator to a ‘random walk’ 
through the posterior distribution, and therefore needs to run for many iterations in order to 
converge on a likely HPD. Badly specified models may take a very long time to converge, 
although what constitutes a sufficient number of iterations depends on the model, data, and 
parameters to be estimated (Jackman 2009, 187-190; Kruschke 2010, 108-109).  
 Convergence is usually evaluated with plots, and if there is no evidence of non-
convergence the model is thought to have run for long enough. Showing the convergence plots 
for every parameter of the analysis is unfeasible however, as there are over 532 different 
parameters, two chains estimating each parameter, and several types of convergence plots to 
evaluate them with. 40 I will show a subset of these to illustrate the general finding that there is 
no evidence of non-convergence in my model, and every parameter seems to have found its 
mark. The rest I have saved and can be supplied upon request. The R-package I use to evaluate 
convergence, ggmcmc, is versatile and user-friendly, and communicates very well with the 
popular ggplot2-package, the go-to plotting tool for many R-users.   
 I first evaluate all the parameters with a Geweke diagnostic and an R-hat test, both of 
which are formal tests of convergence. Formal, in this context, means that they are based on 
actual calculated values from the MCMC chains, not on a visual inspection of them. Neither 
formal nor informal convergence tests are sufficient to test convergence on their own but are 
complimentary. Second, I evaluate the alpha- and theta parameters with informal tests, such as 
running means, trace plots, autocorrelation plots, and density plots.       
 The Geweke z-score diagnostic (Fernández-i-Marín 2016, 9-10) in Figure 9, left panel 
compares the first and last parts of the MCMC chains and reports the z-score for the estimated 
parameter means. The goal is to have no more than 5 percent of the estimates be outside the 
shaded -2/2 interval. This helps identify troublesome chains which do not conform to the 
                                                 
40 The ggmcmc-package potentially produces a pdf of 637 pages containing multiple graph for every parameter. It 
is tremendously helpful, but it requires a selective presentation. Furthermore, because this selection demands a 
specification of which parameters to display in the form of a “regular expression” in R, it is necessary to show ten 
at a time. When showing only five, I can unfortunately only pick from single-digit parameters, i.e. the first nine. 
When showing ten parameters at once, I can select whichever set of parameters I want which start with the same 
two digits (e.g. theta[350-359]). This somewhat limits the presentability of the results, and diagnostics for the first 
nine (e.g. alpha[1-9]) parameters will be somewhat overrepresented.  
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expectations (Fernández-i-Marín 2016, 9-10). The plot shows thirteen red dots and eleven green 
outside the preferred interval, which means that only about 2.25 percent of the 1064 parameter 
estimates are off.  
  
Figure 9: Geweke and R-hat tests  
The Geweke-diagnostic is sensitive to specifications, however. Over several model trials, 41 I 
encountered values that did not conform to the expectations, usually with a family or two of 
parameters showing diverging results in one of the chains. The specifications in question are 
those of model run-time, such as the number of iterations in the simulation. The final model, 
which I ended up using because of the promising convergence diagnostics is the one shown in 
the graphs and whose iteration-values are described above in Chapter 6.1.   
 Similarly, the potential scale reduction factor (Ȓ, or R-hat) compares the between-chain 
with the within-chain variation. If the result is 1 or very close to 1, all is well. A dot plot of R-
                                                 
41 While running multiple models to see which one performs best is often a sign of bad science, this is not the case 
with MCMC simulations (Jackman 2009). It is necessary to evaluate the performance of the simulation post-hoc 
to be confident in the results, and the practice is expected and not equivalent to running “[…] dozens – or more 
likely hundreds – of alternative formulations of the estimation” which Schrodt laments (2014, 287). 
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hat for every parameter is shown in Figure 9, right panel. Note that the scale of the X-axis is 
fitted to the data so that the largest Ȓ-value is only about 1.003. With the default scaling (x-axis 
goes from 1 to 1.5), the dots make an almost straight line at Ȓ = 1, which is the expected result. 
Based on these diagnostics, it is safe to say that there is no dire risk of the simulation not having 
converged. The R-hat test is very much satisfactory, and the Geweke shows that the estimates’ 
z-scores conform to expected values. It is also useful to informally investigate whether a sub-
selection of parameters demonstrate the expected patterns. In the next two sections, I check 
whether some of the alpha- and theta parameters display evidence of non-convergence or if they 
seem fine.42 
7.4.1.  IRT model: Item discrimination parameter alpha 
There are 42 indicators of the economic ability measure, each of which has an estimated 
discrimination parameter alpha. Figure 10, left panel shows a time series of the simulation 
process by iteration for five of the parameters, or a trace plot, with their estimated value on the 
Y-axis. It shows the mixing of the five selected parameters for the two chains and reveals that 
the mixing is quite good. The goal here is to have a uniform, pattern-less buzz, akin to a 
scatterplot to test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals of a regression analysis. (Or the look of 
a hairy caterpillar, as Funk, Camacho, and Johnson (2018) put it). If the chains are flat lines or 
move in the same direction over many iterations, it is a sign of bad mixing and an ill-specified 
model. There is no evidence of that here. (If Markov chains enter a “closed state” from which 
it cannot leave, i.e. a flat line in the trace plot, it is a violation of the irreducibility-assumption 
(Jackman 2009, 179-180).) Note that the first 9.990 iterations are gone – these are the burn-in- 
and adaptive iterations. The fact that the visible iterations start and end at approximately the 
same values means that the number of discarded iterations is not too low.  
 The right panel of Figure 10 shows the density plots for the same parameters. The 
expected result of the density plots is to have the chains overlap as much as possible. Large 
deviations and mismatched shapes of the posterior distribution between the chains is a sign of 
model misspecification and non-convergence in the chains. Neither deviations nor mismatched 
shapes are visible here, however. Plots for items 4, 5, and 6 show some very slight differences 
between the chains, but this is far from worrisome. It is clear from the graphs that there is no 
evidence of non-convergence in the simulation chains. 
                                                 
42 Here I want to thank Martin Tegnander at PRIO, who gave me a whopping 96 GB of memory to create these 




Figure 10: De nsity- and traceplots for alpha parameters  
The discrimination parameter’s running means for five of the indicators are shown in Figure 
11, left panel. The figure indicates that there is little evidence of non-convergence in the alpha 
parameters. Every red and blue line showing running means stabilizes around the black line 
signifying the overall mean. Additionally, the speed with which the running means center 
around the mean is quite high, signifying that there are few issues with the model specification. 
Some parameters take longer than others notably number seven, but none show large deviations 




Figure 11: Running me ans and aut ocorrelation plots for alpha parameters 
Figure 11, right panel shows autocorrelation plots of the simulation process for the same five 
alpha parameters. The values in the plots are the average autocorrelation between the parameter 
and the parameter x lags later. The goal is decreasing autocorrelation as the lags increase, ideally 
with no autocorrelation after lag 1 (Fernández-i-Marín 2016, 8; Jackman 2009, 268). These are 
all pretty quick to reach very low values of autocorrelation. None have notable autocorrelation 
values after about 15 lags. This means that the chains are mixing reasonably fast and that the 
correlation between the individual samples is low. It is not ideal, but autocorrelation is not a 
devastating problem in MCMC simulation theory (Jackman 2009).   
 It is possible to get even greater reductions in the autocorrelation after lag 1, for example 
by increasing the number of samples discarded by the thinning parameter. This hurts the 
estimation somewhat, as all discarded information does. It can however help with reducing the 
storage space and memory used. Thinning is very much a trade-off between efficiency and 
sample size and should not be done without caution. I therefore leave my sample as it is, with 
thinning every ten iterations and 1.000.000 iterations. Any increased number of iterations is 
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unfeasible because of the time it takes, and any additional thinning is unnecessary.  
 Based on these graphs is it safe to say that the alpha-parameters have been simulated 
thoroughly enough. The MCMC process is credible and satisfactorily executed to reflect the 
posterior distribution of the alpha parameter. Except for the autocorrelation test, which could 
be a bit better, the informal convergence-tests for the alpha parameters display no evidence of 
non-convergence. While there are arguments to be made for a more selective choice of 
indicators, I believe that my decision to use every indicator concerning economics of some sort 
is valid for the exploratory and novel way of synthesizing strategy. 
7.4.2.  IRT model: Ability score parameter theta   
For each of the 442 campaign-years in the aggregated sample, a theta parameter is estimated. 
Figure 1243 left panel shows density plots for the two chains for ten of the theta parameters. As 
was the case with the alpha parameters the differences between the chains are small. None of 
the ability scores show divergence which is worth mentioning. This again means that no sign 
of non-convergence is discernible and that the model has run for long enough.   
 The right panel of Figure 12 compares the densities of the entire chain for each 
parameter with the last ten percent of the chain. The parameters are the same as in the left panel 
but are divided into columns by which chain is examined. It is very easy to see which parts of 
the chain affect the posterior distribution in which direction: for instance, for theta parameter 
354 it is the entire first chain that creates the little red bump at approximately value -35. The 
second chain tilts slightly to the right of this value, as does the last ten percent of the first chain. 
When large deviations occur, these easily comparable visual aids can help identify errors in 
different parts of the simulation.   
 With both the density plot and the partial comparison plot however, the case is the same: 
there is no evidence of serious non-convergence. None of the graphs show serious divergence 
from its comparable companion. All the parameters seem to have converged nicely, 
independently of which chain and which part of the chain is examined. 
                                                 
43 The ticks and labels on the Y axes are removed from the entire figure to save space. The densities themselves 
are not important however, only the overlapping shapes of the figures. This is because the two plot-types show the 
same information, partitioned differently. The densities across the graph are therefore an uninteresting quantity for 




Figure 12: De nsity- and partial comparison plots for theta parameters  
Figure 13, left panel displays the running means of the ability score theta for observations 90 
to 99. The scores all converge comfortably after about 12.000 iterations. None of the individual 
ability scores display evidence of non-convergence in this plot. The parameters which are not 
displayed here are mostly similar to those shown, with a few exceptions where it takes longer 
time to converge.44 It is also good to see that the different chains converge on approximately 
the same values. This is not necessarily the case, and when it is, something is usually wrong 
with the model specifications. The phenomenon would of course also be visible in the density 
plot, where two very distinct distribution would have emerged.   
 The running means plot is nice for between-chain comparisons because the panels for 
chain one and two are equally scaled. Together with the density- and partial comparison plots 
above, they also give a very clear idea of which chain, and which part of a chain, is causing the 
posterior to have its particular distribution. When the running means are smooth and show no 
                                                 
44 Observations 35, 60, 67, 136, and 153 are some examples of this, for those who want to check for themselves. 
Replication material will be supplied on request.   
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signs of non-convergence as here, that is difficult to do, but when part of a chain diverges very 
much, it is easily identifiable. These plot diagnostics thus make it easier to correct such errors, 
either by increasing thinning, the number of iterations the simulation runs, or increasing the 
burn-in phase of the simulation. Usually, the latter option is preferred, as the first part of the 
chain is probably the most problematic.   
 
Figure 13: Running me ans and aut ocorrelation plots for theta parameters 
The autocorrelation plot in Figure 13, right panel shows that for the theta parameters,45 the 
problem of autocorrelation is nonexistent. While the alphas displayed some autocorrelation, 
which could have been troublesome, none of the thetas do. The autocorrelation drops to nothing 
right after the first lag. The same is true for most of the thetas, although a few show some 
autocorrelation, but not as much as the alphas and not nearly enough to be a problem.  
 Figure 14 shows the trace plots for five theta parameters. As with the alpha parameters 
and with the previous theta-diagnostics, there are no patterns in the distribution other than a 
                                                 
45 These are theta parameters 90-99. 
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uniform buzz which stays around the same values as the iterations increase. Here too the starting 
value of the iterations are similar to the final ones, indicating that the burn-in period is well 
specified. The scale of the ability scores as visible in all the preceding figures vary between 
approximately -75 and 100. After standardization of the variable to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one, the scale shrinks to that displayed in Table 1, to be between -1.219 
and 3.43624. This only enhances the comparability of the covariates for the hypothesis-testing 
and does not impact the strength or interpretation of the ability score.   
 
Figure 14: Traceplots for theta parameters  
The model is generally successfully applied, with some slight weaknesses in the convergence 
of the alpha parameters, specifically concerning autocorrelation. This is however not very 
important. The values of the theta parameters show variation and are therefore useable as an 
independent variable for hypothesis testing. Neither set of parameters shows evidence of non-
convergence in any other test, and the encompassing formal test (Geweke and R-hat) provide 
no ground for changing or discarding the model.  
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7.4.3. Logistic regression: Regression coefficients beta 
To assess the convergence of the MCMC simulations for the regression model, I use many of 
the same tools as I did for the IRT model above. The logistic regression model has fewer 
parameters than the IRT model, and as such is much easier to interpret visually. The six beta 
coefficients for each right-hand variable and the intercept can easily be gathered in single plots 
and there is no need to choose only a few parameters to inspect.   
 The Geweke- and Ȓ- tests can be seen in Figure 15, left- and right panel respectively. 
The chains display no signs of non-convergence in these tests. The Geweke test records no 
parameter for either chain outside the shaded -2/2 interval, which means that the first and last 
parts of the chains are not too different. The most problematic parameter is the rent2gdp 
parameter, with z-scores of 1 and -1 for the chains. This is not a product of the significant 
number of missing values for this variable, as tax2gdp does not show similarly high z-values 
but has almost twice as many missing values. This may mean that the values of rent2gdp 
converge slower than the rest of the parameters.   
 
Figure 15: Geweke and R-hat tests  
For the Ȓ-test, again the scaling on the X-axis is removed, and the rent2gdp.stdz-parameter is 
well within the bounds of what is expected for a converged chain. Here too, rent2gdp is most 
problematic, meaning that the two simulation chains differ somewhat. Again, the difference is 
negligible, and the chains display no evidence of non-convergence.  
 Figure 16 shows trace- and density plots for the beta parameters. The convergence here 
is very good, as there are no discernible patterns in the trace plots, nor any divergence between 
the two chains in the density plots. This is better than the convergence for the IRT model, even 
though that was already satisfactory. The solid blocks of “white noise” in the trace plots are 
exactly what the time-series of a Monte Carlo Markov Chain should look like, and the two 
chains’ density plots are barely distinguishable from one another. This means that there is no 
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evidence of non-convergence from the values discussed in chapter 6.3, and the simulation 
process seems to have produced reliable estimates. 
 
Figure 16: De nsity- and traceplots for beta parameters  
Figure 17 displays the running means and autocorrelations for the beta parameters in the left- 
and right panel, respectively. Again, the convergence seems to be very good, and there are no 
signs of bad mixing in the running means-plots or of iteration autocorrelation in the 
autocorrelation plots. There is virtually no autocorrelation beyond lag 1, and the running means 
center after about 2.000 iterations. The latter point may be a sign that I have chosen an 
unnecessarily high number of iterations, but the computer power and time required for the 
logistic regression model is very low, at least compared to the IRT model (25 minutes versus 
about 42 hours; This is because of the very high number of parameters needed for the estimation 
of the IRT model, whereas only six are estimated for the logistic regression). The number of 
burn-in- and adaptive iterations may also be unnecessarily high with 1.000 of each. Note also 
that the coefficients for the parameters are not the same as their odds; the fact that the mean of 
the ability-variable is around .7 is consistent with the odds presented in Table 2, chapter 7.2. 
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The running means-plot also displays the ease with which the between-chain variation can be 
assessed here – it is very simple to see whether the running means for each chain are identical 
or not. While some slight variation is to be expected, the fact that they look almost perfectly 
aligned makes the values more reliable.   
 
Figure 17: Running me ans and aut ocorrelation plots for beta parameters  
7.5. Alternative approaches 
There are several other ways in which I could have solved my research problem. For example, 
as I have already pointed out, I could have used principal component factor analysis rather than 
IRT to construct my measure of economic strategies. That way, less information would have 
been lost in the aggregation process. Because factor analysis relies on the correlation matrix of 
variables rather than the data matrix of binary values, I could have aggregated every indicator 
of economic strategy by its sum each year, rather than the maximum count. My reason for 
choosing to use IRT, which requires binary variables in the data matrix, rather than principal 
component factor analysis is simply that I had never used it before and wanted to learn it. This 
is certainly no way to do science – novelty for novelty’s sake is, as Schrodt (2014, 295) puts it, 
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dysfunctional. I have therefore performed a quick, frequentist principal component analysis and 
subsequent logistic regression to amend this problem. The results are in Appendix 10.3. and 
show how 17 different orthogonally rotated factors constructed from the verb-variables 
contribute the proportion of explained variance in the data, and how these together explain the 
likelihood of democratization. The effects while unrefined are messy, with coefficients signs in 
both directions, and are trivial in size. This may indicate that my IRT-aggregation of all 42 
verb-variables is better for predicting democratization. My IRT model might however be 
overexplaining democratization as well by including too many indicators. Comparing the two 
is unfair, however – I’ve spent close to nine months on one model and an afternoon on the other.  
 The utility of factor analysis is accentuated by its inductive character, which allows for 
groupings of variables based on their shared variance rather than theoretical coherence. Of 
course, deduction and induction in measurement are complimentary, but it is advantageous 
when choosing indicators to first, investigate which are correlated and explain the same 
variation and second, to check whether they can be conceptually linked, for instance as 
indicative of an “economic” strategy.   
 This advantage is lost in my IRT model because I have no theory supporting an approach 
with several types of economic strategy. By selecting all those indicators with some connection 
to economic factors and excluding those without it, I have lost some room for interpretation of 
the item discrimination parameters. Surely, I could have limited the number of indicator 
variables to only those which discriminate campaigns above a certain threshold. The resulting 
ability score for a campaign’s economicness would be more parsimonious, and the MCMC 
simulations easier to run and evaluate. This may have an effect on the hypothesis testing.  
 Another possible approach is to use a clustering algorithm and find groups of 
observations which share some trait or another, and then test whether some are more likely to 
produce democratization by simple ANOVA test, for example. This approach would potentially 
result in a typology of groups as well as a test of my hypothesis. Jordana, Fernández-i-Marín, 
and Bianculli (2018) construct measurement models for four dimensions of institutional 
features of regulatory agencies using IRT and factor analysis and subsequently a clustering 
algorithm to identify six types of regulatory agencies. An identical framework for nonviolent 
campaigns would have allowed me to simply compare the occurrence of democratization in 
each cluster with ANOVA. This would indeed have been an elegant way of answering the 
research question, and with the interesting auxiliary output of a potential typology of nonviolent 
campaigns. Perhaps some combination of economic and violent strategy as particularly 
disadvantageous; or perhaps economic strategy without some other strategy in combination 
82 
 
with it is useless.  I strongly recommend this approach as a continuation of my work in this 
thesis.   
 Machine learning and random forest models are also options which could satisfactorily 
answer the research question. While my knowledge of them is limited, such models can be 
useful for both classification and regression and are not prohibitively complicated to execute. 
Learning to use them properly is relatively easy with free information and dedicated people on 
the Internet, and particularly the R community is very helpful. In my own analyses, few 
problems I had were novel, and most had easily accessible solutions online.     
 As the source material from which the data are recorded consists of AFP newspaper 
articles, an interesting approach would also be to use a structural topic model to investigate the 
language in the articles, as well as the frequency of articles on a political conflict. Are higher 
volumes of press coverage, or some words or topics connected with democratization or 
repression? Sadly, the newspaper articles themselves are not currently available, but it would 
be interesting to see an analysis similar to Grimmer (2009), who analyzes latent topics in the 
text of US Congress press releases. The approach is similar to mine in that it uses latent topics 
as an interesting quantity as I use economic strategy but uses text as data rather than as source 
materials.     
8.  Conclusion 
In this thesis, I sat out to investigate whether economic nonviolent strategies are conducive to 
democratization. I was primarily motivated by the research gap on nonviolent strategy in the 
aggregate. The current literature on nonviolent movements has little to say about which 
strategies succeed and which fail, apart from the general “nonviolence is better than violence”-
finding. Seeing that this finding is explained foremost by the importance of limiting the state’s 
access to means of violence – its primary defining characteristic and source of power – I argued 
that this is a testament to the Weberian definition of a state. A counterdefinition is the 
Schumpeterian one. Swapping Schumpeter’s “tax-monopoly” for the more general 
“economically capable state,” I then deduced that a similar relationship should exist with the 
state’s economic resources. I stated that states need financial as well as military capacity and 
argued that it should be possible to replace its regime by targeting state finances through 
economic nonviolent protest. More specifically, the capacity of a state to impose its policies 
depends on the financial capacity and consent of its population, and therefore can be limited 
with certain strategic foci. To situate the problem in the broader democratization literature, I 
connected these points to the Dahlian cost of repression/cost of tolerance-concepts and 
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narrowed the theoretical discussion toward my particular research question. This is a 
commensurable approach which “advance[s] the logical economy in a field” (Gerring 2012b, 
60, 68-69) and merges the Dahlian democratization theory with Sharp’s theory of wielding 
power effectively. It further resonates well with most existing literature on democratization in 
that it touches upon concepts like stability, capacity, wealth, and class.    
 Then, to investigate the relationship between economic nonviolent strategy and 
democratization, I indulged in a discussion of what the core definitional traits of a ‘strategy’, 
‘nonviolence’, and how best to operationalize the terms with resonance and commensurability. 
The result of this discussion was first that the data collected to not directly correspond to the 
conceptual discussions available. Secondly, I concluded that the data on nonviolent tactics and 
strategies which exist, and primarily the NAVCO 3.0 data, are well-suited to aggregation. 
 Thirdly, the conceptual discussion contributed to specifying the domain in which my 
findings apply. For studying mechanisms, causality, patterns, or trends in social behavior it is 
imperative to understand the context in which humans act. This is an epistemological point as 
well as a practical one: we cannot know much about a phenomenon without an idea of its 
context or domain; and in order to collect and compare findings about similar phenomena, we 
must identify likenesses and dissimilarities between phenomena, their contexts, and their 
defining traits. I have argued that for economic nonviolent action, the conceptual framework of 
contentious politics is appropriate, and it should be discussed as part of that domain. I also 
argued that it is appropriate to compare economic nonviolence to other types of nonviolence, 
as well as to violent contentious politics. The latter necessitates attention to different causal 
mechanisms and patterns of state- and protest behavior, but violent and nonviolent contentious 
politics are not opposites. Rather, they are different styles of action with different traits. As  
Kudelia (2018) and Aitchison (2018) argue, violence and nonviolence can complement and 
substitute one another.   
 Following the theoretical and abstract discussions, I explained my choice to aggregate 
and reduce the NAVCO 3.0 data by way of an IRT model. The method requires binary data and 
results in a considerable information loss when they are aggregated by its maximum value rather 
than their count. However, the results seem reliable and possessive of causal utility. The 
indicators chosen to represent economic strategies were deductively chosen and could have 
been selected with greater attention to their interrelationships.   
 Desiring to use my ability score for hypothesis testing, I then explained my choice to 
use logistic regression. Having chosen a binary indicator of democratization rather than a metric 
one for primarily ontological reasons but also as a hard test of my hypothesis, the logistic 
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regression follows logically.  Both of these analyses were performed using Bayesian methods. 
Because I have not employed sample- or experimental data where potentially repeated sampling 
makes frequentist significance testing possible, this is appropriate.   
 The results of the logistic regression show that an increase of one standard deviation in 
economic strategy corresponds to more than a doubling in the likelihood for transitions to 
democracy. This is a large effect that speaks to both the nonviolence- and the democratization 
literature. My research design and -question, which have not been used or investigated 
quantitatively before in the nonviolence literature, contribute to filling a research gap which is 
relevant both theoretically, empirically, and practically. I suggest that subsequent research use 
more latent variable models such as item response theory, factor analysis, cluster analysis, 
structural topic modeling and similar techniques to find and test the efficiency of different 
nonviolent strategies. This will make researchers able to give relevant advice to activists by 
bringing the level of analysis down to a more concrete level. It will also contribute to the 
cumulative knowledge on democratization and nonviolence and as such better our 
understanding of these important and interesting phenomena.  
 The finding also speaks to the importance of conceptualizing and measuring 
phenomenon properly, and to theorizing how and how much different types of contentious 
political action impact politics. I have argued that the data I used are appropriate to 
definitionally represent Gene Sharp’s concept of nonviolent action and that they possess causal 
utility for my research question. It is not obvious that variables recording very fine-grained 
types of action are appropriate without paying attention to the surrounding concepts, the 
inclusion criteria of the data, contrast-space, and theoretical discussions about contentious 
politics. My conceptual discussion allows the results of my analysis to be interpreted as a part 
of a larger set of phenomena from which many possible research questions and -designs spring, 
and they provide fertile ground for theorizing and testing new links between action and 
consequence.   
 I have thus taken a convincing step toward establishing a reliable, quantitative 
relationship between the strategies of nonviolent political movements and regime transitions. 
Much work remains to be done to craft a complete empirical narrative of the relationships in 
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10. Appendix  
10.1.  List of indicators for IRT model  
Variable code Description Label in MCMC figures, tables 
v_0211 Appeal for economic cooperation 1 
v_0231 Appeal for economic aid. 2 
v_0233 Appeal for humanitarian aid 3 
v_0311 Express intent to cooperate economically 4 
v_0254 Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 5 
v_0331 Express intent to provide economic aid. 6 
v_0333 Express intent to provide humanitarian aid 7 
v_0354 Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 8 
v_061 Cooperate economically 9 
v_071 Provide economic aid 10 
v_073 Provide humanitarian aid. 11 
v_0842 Return, release property 12 
v_085 Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo. 13 
v_0863 Allow humanitarian access. 14 
v_1011 Demand economic cooperation 15 
v_1031 Demand economic aid 16 
v_1033 Demand humanitarian aid 17 
v_1054 Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo. 18 
v_1211 Reject economic cooperation. 19 
v_1221 Reject request for economic aid. 20 
v_1223 Reject request for humanitarian aid. 21 
v_1244 Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 22 
v_1311 Threaten to reduce or stop aid. 23 
v_1312 Threaten with sanctions, boycott, or embargo. 24 
v_1314 Threaten economic consequences. 25 
v_1381 Threaten blockade 26 
v_1382 Threaten occupation 27 
v_143 Conduct strike or boycott, not specified below 28 
v_1431 Conduct strike or boycott for leadership change. 29 
v_1432 Conduct strike or boycott for policy change. 30 
v_1433 Conduct strike or boycott for rights 31 
v_1434 Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime. 32 
v_1441 Obstruct passage to demand leadership change. 33 
v_1442 Obstruct passage to demand policy change 34 
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v_1443 Obstruct passage to demand rights. 35 
v_1444 Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime. 36 
v_1621 Reduce or stop economic assistance. 37 
v_1623 Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance 38 
v_1663 Expel or withdraw aid agencies. 39 
v_171 Seize or damage property, not specified below. 40 
v_1711 Confiscate property 41 
v_1712 Destroy property. 42 
 
10.2.  Frequentist logistic regression  
Covariates Coefficient SD z-value Pr(>|z|) 
ability 1.1625** 0.3888 2.990 0.002 
gdp -0.4916 1.0267 -2.046 0.632 
aid -0.4307 0.4343 -0.992 0.321 
tax2gdp -1.1095* 0.5423 -2.046 0.040 
rent2gdp -0.2495 0.6048 -0.412 0.680 
intercept -5.0327*** 0.6966 -7.224 0.000 
*** = p<0.000, ** = p<0.001, * = p<0.05. Dependent variable: Transition to democracy. N=442. 
The frequentist regression shows that the trends are similar albeit with different coefficient 
sizes. To avoid deletion of cases with missing values on the control variables, I used the imputed 
dataset mentioned in chapter 7.2. 
10.3.  Frequentist PCA analysis and logistic regression 
 
The first 17 indicators, sorted by eigenvalue, have eigenvalues >1 and explain more than one 




These same 17 indicators together explain 79 per cent of the variation. The results of the 
frequentist logistic regression can be seen in the image below. The principal components PC1-
PC17 are uncorrelated, and they contribute unequally to the prediction of democratization, and 
in different directions. The results can help understand which indicators tug in what direction, 





10.4.  Ability scores for Kenya, Tanzania, and the US year.  
 
